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ARTICLE 
HEALTH CARE REFORM’S WILD CARD:  THE UNCERTAIN 
EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
RICHARD S. SAVER† 
Comparative effectiveness research (CER) stands out as the intriguing wild 
card of health care reform.  CER compares competing treatments against each 
other to determine which interventions work best, supplying critical information 
for medical decisionmaking and health policy.  If CER works as planned, it 
may be one of the few reform measures in the final health care legislation that 
could flatten the cost curve while also improving quality.  Unfortunately, 
health care reform has so far failed to bet smart and play the CER wild card ef-
fectively.  While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act invests in CER 
at record levels and creates an entirely new regulatory framework for oversight 
of the research, the new law does very little to advance the difficult work of 
translating CER into actual medical practice.  First, CER is costly to conduct 
and its data often raise more questions than answers.  Second, the govern-
ment’s CER agenda seems vague and ill-defined, not consistently focusing on 
generating research that will help clinicians resolve immediate treatment ques-
tions.  Third, and most important, physicians likely will remain indifferent to 
and “tune out” CER.  Health law and policy are not setting the right incen-
tives for physicians to adapt their practice patterns to CER and, in some re-
spects, exacerbate the physician-engagement difficulties.  The reasons for physi-
cian indifference to CER include:  lack of financial incentives, suspicions of 
industry bias in the public/private oversight of the research, threats to clinical 
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autonomy, a commitment to individualized medicine (encouraged by health 
law, professional ethics, and medical norms) that remains in tension with 
CER, concerns that CER is a vehicle for crude cost-cutting, and malpractice 
liability fears.  To be truly effective, the new national CER program requires 
targeted reforms designed to engage physicians more directly with the research.  
This Article’s principal suggestions include greater linkage of CER with reim-
bursement and liability incentives, enhanced use of academic detailing, and 
more support for comparative implementation studies that evaluate different 
strategies for fostering physician uptake of CER. 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 2149 
I. BACKGROUND:  CER STATUTORY PROVISIONS ............................. 2157 
A. Previous CER Efforts ....................................................... 2157 
B. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ......... 2158 
C. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ................... 2159 
D. Definitional Issues ........................................................... 2160 
E. Comparative Effectiveness Versus Cost-Effectiveness .............. 2164 
F. Limitations on Use of CER ............................................... 2166 
II. INFORMATION GAPS AND WHAT DRIVES MEDICAL 
DECISIONMAKING ......................................................................... 2170 
III. TRANSLATION BARRIERS .............................................................. 2175 
A. Vagueness and Mission Creep ........................................... 2176 
B. Costly Studies That Raise More Questions Than Answers ..... 2177 
1. Cost ........................................................................ 2178 
2. Secondary Data, Less Rigorous Research 
Methodologies, and Varying Measures 
of Effectiveness ...................................................... 2178 
3. Accounting for Individual Patient Differences .... 2180 
4. Accounting for Individual Provider Differences . 2181 
5. Keeping Pace with Innovation .............................. 2183 
6. Uncertain Answers ................................................ 2184 
C. Financial Incentives ........................................................ 2184 
D. Bias and Public/Private Oversight .................................... 2186 
E. Clinical Autonomy and the Technological Imperative ........... 2190 
F. “Individualized” Medicine ............................................... 2192 
G. Liability Concerns ........................................................... 2196 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 2198 
A. Coverage Rules and Financial Incentives ............................ 2199 
B. Malpractice Liability Incentives ......................................... 2202 
C. Academic Detailing ......................................................... 2203 
D. Comparative Implementation Research ............................... 2205 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 2206 
 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2149 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the recent enactment of historic health care reform legisla-
tion,1 serious questions remain whether the entire health care overhaul 
will implode.  Many health policy experts believe that the new law, in 
primarily focusing on access, does not sufficiently address intractable 
cost and quality problems in the health care system.2  The public shares 
these concerns.3  As the debate continues, comparative effectiveness re-
search (CER) stands out as the intriguing wild card of health care 
reform.  CER is one of the few reform provisions in the final legislation 
that, if deployed properly, offers a plausible opportunity to bend the 
cost curve while also improving the quality of care.  Indeed, CER pro-
ponents optimistically claim that, over the long haul, CER can radically 
 
1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See, e.g., Elenora E. Connors & Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Care Reform—A Histor-
ic Moment in US Social Policy, 303 JAMA 2521, 2522 (2010) (“The United States, howev-
er, missed a unique opportunity to significantly reduce medical costs and improve 
quality.”); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Michael J. Ramlet, Health Care Reform Is Likely to Wi-
den Federal Budget Deficits, Not Reduce Them, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1136, 1136-40 (2010) (de-
tailing methodological problems with government projections that found PPACA 
would reduce the budget deficit); Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Systemwide 
Cost Control—The Missing Link in Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1131-
33 (2009) (emphasizing that the new law does not restrain spending); Gina Kolata, 
Law May Do Little to Help Curb Unnecessary Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at D1 (con-
cluding that the new bill does little to help reduce the “nation’s chronic overuse of 
medical care”); David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance:  Is Health Reform a 
“Game Changer?” 16-21 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. LE10-010, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624311 (making predictions about the cost im-
plications of the new legislation); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Health Care Law’s Unfinished 
Business:  Cost Curbs, ABC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
wireStory?id=10470267 (discussing the failure of the health care bill to control costs). 
 Other commentators, including the former director of the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and the special health policy advisor of the OMB, 
remain more optimistic.  See Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform 
and Cost Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 601 (2010) (responding to concerns that the 
new law would increase the deficit). 
3 See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 
1-4 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8084-F.pdf (finding 
forty-six percent of seniors polled had an unfavorable view of the new law and were 
concerned about high costs and benefit cuts that could harm quality of care); Mark 
Trumbull, Opinion Polls:  Obama’s Health Care Reform Law Not a Winner So Far, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0330/ 
Opinion-polls-Obama-s-health-care-reform-law-not-a-winner-so-far (noting voters’ con-
cerns that the new law will “erode the quality of care and jack up costs”) .   
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transform the practice of medicine.4  Unfortunately, health care reform 
has so far failed to bet smart and play the CER wild card effectively. 
While there are varying and sometimes inconsistent definitions of 
CER,5 it involves, at bottom, comparing competing medical treatments 
against each other to determine which interventions work best.  The 
new governmental push for CER responds to increasing concerns that 
physicians often make clinical decisions without a solid foundation of 
credible medical evidence, particularly evidence as to how treatments 
compare to each other.  A recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report 
suggests that sound scientific studies support less than half of the 
treatments that physicians recommend.6  Uncertainties arising from 
this information gap contribute to unexpected variations in the 
treatment of patients with similar conditions and can result in costly, 
ineffective, and even dangerous medical care.7 
Health care reform has led to both heavy investment in CER and 
the creation of a new regulatory framework for oversight of the re-
search.  Congress took the first major step with the federal stimulus 
legislation by including an appropriation of $1.1 billion to fund CER 
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the 
 
4 See, e.g., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM’N ON A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH 
SYS., BENDING THE CURVE:  OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND IMPROVING VALUE IN 
U.S. HEALTH SPENDING 19-21 (2007), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2007/Dec/Bending-the-Curve--Options-for-
Achieving-Savings-and-Improving-Value-in-U-S--Health-Spending.aspx (projecting the 
benefits of a CER system); Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness 
Research—The Oregon Experience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18, e18(1)-(3) (2010), 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0912938 (arguing that CER can limit 
future health care spending by following the example of the health care policies im-
plemented in Oregon). 
5 See infra Section I.D (discussing how definitional questions affect CER imple-
mentation).  
6 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., LEARNING WHAT WORKS BEST:  THE NATION’S 
NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2007). 
7 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2975, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FED-
ERAL ROLE 12 (2007) (“[T]he apparent variation in [treatment] norms indicates that 
there is not sufficient evidence to determine which approach is most appropriate.”); 
FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 3 (2009) 
[hereinafter FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT] (describing some benefits to patients from 
CER); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARA-
TIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 80-84 (2009) (describing information gaps in research 
that CER should aim to correct); Elliott S. Fisher et al., Slowing the Growth of Health Care 
Costs—Lessons from Regional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850-51 (2009) (discuss-
ing how variations in health care spending show that much care is unnecessary). 
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Recovery Act).8  The recently enacted health care reform law, the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),9 provides an addi-
tional stream of CER funding—up to $500 million per year by 2013 or 
2014—and establishes a new oversight entity, the Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute (the PCOR Institute), to direct the na-
tion’s first comprehensive CER program.10 
CER attracts considerable enthusiasm as a tool for health care 
reform because it differs from conventional medical research in impor-
tant ways.  Traditional studies ordinarily evaluate an experimental in-
tervention’s general effectiveness by comparing it to a placebo.  CER in-
stead focuses on how effective treatments are relative to each other.  In 
other words, traditional research typically asks, “Does this work?” whe-
reas CER asks the question practicing physicians really want to know:  
“Is this better than that?”11  Also, conventional medical investigations 
usually evaluate new technology under tightly controlled, highly artifi-
cial conditions that exclude many subjects, whereas CER includes 
treatments already adopted in clinical practice and studies populations 
more representative of typical patients.12  As such, CER promises to de-
velop better information for medical decisionmaking in real world set-
tings.  In theory, better information will translate to better medical care.  
Various commentators predict that CER has the power “to reshape ma-
jor portions of the practice of medicine,”13 that it provides “the scientific 
scaffolding for . . . revolution”14 in medical practice, and that it ushers 
health care into a new “era of comparative effectiveness.”15 
 
8 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (to be codified in scattered sections of 6, 
19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). 
9 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 727-38 (2010) (to be codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
10 See infra Section I.C (discussing the creation of the PCOR Institute). 
11 Harold C. Sox & Sheldon Greenfield, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  A Report 
from the Institute of Medicine, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 203, 204 (2009). 
12 See infra Section I.D. 
13 Mohammad N. Akhter & Richard A. Levinson, Editorial, Comparative Effectiveness 
Research and the Future Practice of Medicine, 101 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1301, 1301 (2009). 
14 Bob Wachter, Are We Mature Enough to Make Use of Comparative Effectiveness Research?, 
WACHTER’S WORLD (Feb. 21, 2009, 5:48 AM), http://community.the-hospitalist.org/ 
blogs/wachters_world/archive/2009/02/21/are-we-mature-enough-to-make-use-of-
comparative-effectiveness-research.aspx. 
15 Joe Jancsurak, Ushering in an Era of “Comparative Effectiveness,” MED. DESIGN (Feb. 
19, 2009, 9:23 AM), http://medicaldesign.com/letters/comparative_effectiveness_ 
0209 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Susan Dentzer, Comparative Effective-
ness:  Coherent Health Care at Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1756, 1756 (2010) (describing com-
parative effectiveness research as a “turning point” for American society). 
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Rather than revolutionizing medicine, however, this Article cau-
tions that the emerging era of comparative effectiveness is in danger of 
becoming disappointingly ineffective.  Serious legal and policy obstacles 
jeopardize the health care system’s ability to make productive use of go-
vernmentally funded CER. 
First, CER already has considerable political baggage after being 
swept into the larger, acrimonious battles over health care reform.  
Opponents of the Democrats’ health care proposals pointedly focused 
on CER, charging that it would lead to rationing of health care,16 go-
vernmental interference in the doctor-patient relationship,17 and, more 
ominously, the empowerment of “death panels.”18  Also, stakeholders 
waged hard-fought turf battles over how to administer the new national 
CER program.  The new reform law jettisons the federal-commission 
approach of previous legislation19 in favor of ceding direct authority to 
private interests through creation of the PCOR Institute, a nonprofit 
corporation that will include drug, device, and insurance company 
representatives on its governing board.20  CER faces longer-term polit-
ical risks as well.  Various physician groups, drug companies, and de-
vice manufacturers understandably view CER as a threat because the 
research may question the necessity and value of their products and 
 
16 See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed., Stimulus Math for the GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 
2009, at A19 (“The CER . . . would dramatically advance government control—and ra-
tioning—of health care . . . .”); see also Jerry Avorn, Debate About Funding Comparative-
Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1928-29 (2009) (discussing other po-
litical charges made against CER during the debate over health care reform). 
17 See, e.g., Betsy McCaughey, Ruin Your Health with the Obama Stimulus Plan (Feb. 9, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLzfDxfbwhzs 
(objecting to provisions that would “guide” doctors’ decisions). 
18 See, e.g., Victoria Colliver, Stimulus Prompts Talk of Health Care Rationing, S.F. 
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2009, at A12 (explaining the views of CER opponents); Joseph Ashby, 
“Death Panel” Is Not in the Bill . . . It Already Exists, AM. THINKER (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/08/death_panel_is_not_in_the_bill.html (char-
acterizing CER as leading to “death panels”); Peter Ferrara, The Absolutely Worst Bill Ev-
er, AM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:08 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/ 
2009/11/11/the-absolutely-worst-bill-ever (describing “death panels” as groups that 
“have the power to ration and deny you health care”). 
19 The earlier Recovery Act had created the Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, an entity akin to a federal commission, to direct 
the government’s new CER program.  See infra Section I.B. 
20 See infra Section I.C.  Other proposals for administering a national CER pro-
gram have included folding CER activities into existing agencies such as the National 
Institutes of Health or the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  See, e.g., 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 15-19 (suggesting organizational strategies for 
CER oversight); Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Informa-
tion, 25 HEALTH AFF. 572 (2006) (describing necessary attributes for CER oversight). 
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services.  These powerful stakeholders can be expected to use the po-
litical process to discredit certain studies and to weaken governmental 
support for CER more generally, as has happened in the past.21 
While not minimizing these obstacles, this Article contends that 
health care reform’s new push for CER faces a more fundamental 
problem:  lawmakers have essentially defanged CER, deploying it un-
der conditions that will leave it underpowered.  In part to appease 
critics who fear that CER will lead to rationing and crude cost control, 
a great deal of legislative and political attention has been devoted to 
restricting its use.22  This leaves unresolved the critical question—what 
will be done with the information? 
Not much.  Many physicians seem unlikely to change clinical prac-
tice patterns, notwithstanding the outcomes of CER studies.  Health 
law and policy are not setting the right incentives for physicians to in-
corporate CER into regular clinical practice and, in some respects, ex-
acerbate the physician-engagement difficulties.  This Article explores 
why.  It also considers how health law and policy tools could better 
support CER’s translation into medical practice. 
A key assumption of this Article is that the success of the govern-
ment’s new CER program depends most on targeted physician en-
gagement.  The intended audience for a national CER program cer-
tainly includes other stakeholders.  As CER proponents maintain, 
comparative effectiveness evidence should empower patients and pay-
ers as consumers of health care, equipping them with better informa-
tion to navigate the complicated health care system.23  But as a prac-
tical matter, very little can be accomplished without meaningful 
physician participation.  Although new models of shared decision-
 
21 For example, the now-defunct Agency for Health Care Policy and Research 
(AHCPR) issued reports in the mid-1990s questioning the efficacy of common back sur-
geries.  A political backlash, led by surgeon groups and medical device manufacturers, 
resulted in considerable budget reductions for AHCPR and new limitations on the agen-
cy’s authority.  See MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 632, A BETTER 
WAY TO GENERATE AND USE COMPARATIVE-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 7-8 (2009) (caution-
ing about the dangers of politicization when a federal agency controls research). 
22 See infra Section I.F. 
23 See, e.g., FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4 (“Patients increa-
singly and appropriately want to take responsibility for their care.  Therefore we have a 
responsibility to provide comparative information to enable informed decision-
making.  This patient-centered, pragmatic, ‘real world’ research is a fundamental re-
quirement for improving care for all Americans.”); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., supra note 6, at 6 (“Insurers perhaps most acutely feel the need for much more 
reliable, rigorous, transparent, and impartial comparative effectiveness information to 
make decisions in the growing marketplace of medical interventions.”). 
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making between patients and physicians increasingly attract academic 
and clinical interest,24 physicians continue to perform the fundamen-
tal role of gatekeeper.  Because of information asymmetries and agen-
cy relationships, physicians can induce or control the bulk of health 
care expenditures.25  The ability of health care payers to direct medi-
cal decisionmaking in the absence of physician agreement remains 
questionable.26  Meanwhile, medical decisionmaking studies raise se-
rious doubts that patients have sufficient capacity, resources, and mo-
tivation to use effectiveness information to challenge what their physi-
cians otherwise recommend.27 
 
24 “Shared decisionmaking” refers to a process in which the physician and patient 
consider outcomes, probabilities, and the patient’s value preferences to reach mutual 
agreement on a treatment plan.  Shared decisionmaking is particularly recommended 
for situations of medical uncertainty, as the process in part aims to inform the patient 
about the limited predictive evidence and then determine how to proceed, accounting 
for the patient’s personal value preferences.  Shared decisionmaking differs from the 
traditional legal-bioethics model of informed consent, which has emphasized the physi-
cian’s duty to disclose over joint participation in the decisionmaking.  See generally Domi-
nick L. Frosch & Robert M. Kaplan, Shared Decision Making in Clinical Medicine:  Past Re-
search and Future Directions, 17 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 285, 285 (1999) (reviewing 
literature on shared decisionmaking and concluding that the process is “an important 
development in health care”); Stacey L. Sheridan et al., Shared Decision Making About 
Screening and Chemoprevention:  A Suggested Approach from the U.S. Preventive Services Task 
Force, 26 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 56, 59-60 (2004) (defining shared decisionmaking).   
25 See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism:  Self-Regulation in the Medical 
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 356 (2001) (“Physicians influence or control approx-
imately seventy-five percent of health care spending through their practice patterns.”); 
Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:  Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988) (estimating that individual practition-
ers control seventy to ninety percent of health care expenditures). 
26 See, e.g., Ana I. Balsa et al., Clinical Uncertainty and Healthcare Disparities, 29 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 203, 205 (2003) (noting that medical practice involves a great deal of physician 
discretion and “[n]either insurance contracts nor ethical and legal rules do a great deal 
to narrow the resulting clinical discretion”); Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm 
of Medical Care:  Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 425 (1990) (“[P]ayers 
are essentially locked into underwriting all care meeting professional standards.”). 
27 For example, a recent study published in Health Affairs indicates that patients 
have difficulty understanding what “quality guidelines” and “medical evidence” mean, 
and that they are dubious about evidence-based information to the extent that it prec-
ludes the ability of their physicians to provide individually tailored care.  Kristin L. 
Carman et al., Evidence That Consumers Are Skeptical About Evidence-Based Health Care, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1400 (2010).  The study suggests that, notwithstanding other credible 
sources of information, patients will likely continue to “rely heavily on their doctors for 
information, interpretation, and guidance on treatment options.”  Id. at 1403.  The 
authors also concluded that patients’ beliefs and attitudes “are often incompatible with 
evidence-based approaches” to medical care, such as CER.  Id. at 1405.  More general-
ly, despite the theoretical appeal of the patient-as-consumer model, patients often per-
form poorly as consumers.  See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Con-
sumers:  Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644-66 
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History cautions that it is not easy to change physician behavior, 
even when good medical data justifies new approaches.  Numerous 
quality-improvement policy initiatives have stalled because informa-
tion dissemination alone failed to engage physicians in the clinical 
trenches.28  Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office has questioned 
whether a national CER program will generate significant cost savings, 
in part because of doubts that practitioners will quickly adopt the new 
evidence into actual health care delivery.29  Better effectiveness infor-
mation does not necessarily affect the adoption of new medical tech-
nology or physicians’ ultimate choice of treatment.  Medical practice 
remains quite variable, significantly affected by nonclinical factors such 
as reimbursement incentives and pharmaceutical marketing.30  This va-
riability already presents numerous challenges for health law, compli-
cating medical-technology regulation31 and frustrating the malpractice 
system’s attempts to define a uniform standard of care.32 
No doubt, the concerns raised here about CER’s future viability 
may seem unduly pessimistic and even counterintuitive.  After all, 
 
(2008); Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life:  Can Consumers Direct Health 
Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 59-65 (2009). 
28 See, e.g., Valerie Weber & Maulik S. Joshi, Effecting and Leading Change in Health 
Care Organizations, 26 J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 388, 388-92 (2000) (discussing the li-
mited success of Total Quality Management (TQM) and Quality Improvement (QI) 
initiatives in hospitals in the 1990s because of lack of physician participation and, at 
times, physician resistance to changing practice patterns).  
29 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3185, BUDGET OPTIONS VOLUME 1:  HEALTH 
CARE 86-87 (2008); see also Mark McClellan & Joshua Benner, Comparative Effectiveness 
Research:  Will It Bend the Health Care Cost Curve and Improve Quality? (noting that critics 
object that CER “evidence may be outdated by the time it is available”), in ENGELBERG 
CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE EF-
FECTIVENESS RESEARCH:  PRIORITIES, METHODS, AND IMPACT 7, 9 (2009) [hereinafter 
BROOKINGS INST.]. 
30 See infra Part II. 
31 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard 
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 394-400 (2002) (examining intrica-
cies of postapproval drug regulation and how physicians deviate from approved uses); 
Amy L. Wax, Technology Assessment and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 82 VA. L. REV. 1641, 
1648-49 (1996) (noting that practitioners base their assessments of cost-benefit tradeoffs 
for new technologies on “intuition, prejudice, anecdote, or unsubstantiated lore”). 
32 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice 
Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 127 (1991) (“[M]edical science . . . tho-
roughly fails to conform to the legal ideal of an established standard of care.  In most 
instances, no such definitive standard exists.”); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:  
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insur-
ance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 636 (2003) (“Medical liability law reflects the paradox of want-
ing health insurers to be objective and consistent about coverage decisions when un-
derlying medical practice is often neither.”). 
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what’s not to like about CER?  Special-interest-group politics aside, 
why would ordinary physicians oppose gathering better medical evi-
dence about how treatments compare to each other?  Why would they 
not find such research persuasive?  Investigating the relative effective-
ness of medical treatments seems inherently positive.  Some even view 
it as a public good, particularly deserving of special governmental 
support.33  Also, CER seems a rather neutral reform strategy that, in 
theory, should appeal to different ends of the political spectrum.  
Both market-based and regulatory-based approaches for improving 
health care depend on the availability of good information about the 
relative value of different medical treatments.  Knowledge gaps about 
differences in the quality of care affect not only patients, but also pro-
viders, payers, and regulators, contributing to many system problems.34  
Stimulating the production of better information and facilitating data 
transparency are preferred strategies for advancing important health 
law and policy objectives and for optimal regulation more generally.35 
Notwithstanding the theoretical merits of better information, 
many physicians will remain skeptical, critical, or—most likely—indiff-
erent about CER.  Physicians in the clinical trenches lack strong in-
centives to consider CER in making medical-treatment decisions.  In-
deed, for a variety of reasons, they can be expected to “tune out” the 
research and continue traditional practice patterns. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the legislative background, including 
statutory limitations on the use of CER.  It also considers the unclear 
boundaries between CER and cost-effectiveness analysis, an uncertainty 
that fuels physicians’ fears about rationing and general distrust about 
the governmental push for CER.  Part II discusses why the health care 
 
33 Compare MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  RE-
FORMING THE DELIVERY SYSTEM 107-08 (2008), available at http://www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/jun08_entirereport.pdf (“Because [CER] information can benefit all users 
and is a public good, the Commission concluded a federal role is necessary to produce 
the information and make it publicly available.”), with CANNON, supra note 21, at 1 
(conceding that comparative effectiveness information has public-good characteristics 
but questioning whether it should receive governmental support). 
34 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 6, at 2-3; David A. Hyman, 
Regulating Managed Care:  What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
221, 233-34 (2000).  
35 See generally Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1577 (2007) (examining the information imperfections in health 
care markets and how better data can improve regulation); William M. Sage, Regulating 
Through Information:  Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 
(1999) (discussing how greater availability of information can promote competition, 
strengthen agency relationships, improve productive efficiency, ensure accountability, 
and foster democratic decisionmaking). 
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system often lacks credible information about comparative effective-
ness and briefly reviews the nonclinical factors that heavily influence 
physician decisionmaking. 
Part III explores the many barriers to translating CER into clinical 
practice.  The research is costly to conduct and may raise more ques-
tions than answers.  Further, current plans for the national CER pro-
gram seem overly expansive, extending to investigations that physi-
cians likely will find less useful in resolving immediate treatment 
decisions.  Physicians can be expected to disregard CER for additional 
reasons, including:  lack of financial incentives, suspicions of industry 
bias in the public/private oversight of the research, clinical autonomy 
concerns, a commitment to individualized medicine (encouraged by 
medical ethics, health law, and professional norms) that remains in 
tension with CER, and malpractice-liability considerations. 
Part IV offers legal and policy recommendations for improving the 
translation of CER into medical practice.  The principal suggestions 
include greater linkage of CER with reimbursement and liability incen-
tives, enhanced use of academic detailing to disseminate the research 
information, and more funding for comparative implementation studies 
that evaluate different strategies for fostering physician uptake of CER. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  CER STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A.  Previous CER Efforts 
Combined, the Recovery Act and PPACA invest in CER at record 
levels and create the nation’s first comprehensive CER program.  
While governmental entities such as the Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality (AHRQ) have supported discrete CER activities in 
the past, the size and scope of such efforts has been modest.36  No sin-
 
36 The Recovery Act gave $300 million in funding to the AHRQ for CER, an 
amount roughly equal to the agency’s entire annual budget.  Robert Steinbrook, Health 
Care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1058 
(2009).  Previous legislation only modestly supported CER—for example, the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 provided about $15 
million per year in funding to AHRQ for research into outcomes and comparative clini-
cal effectiveness of certain health care items and services.  Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1013(e), 
117 Stat. 2066, 2438-41 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(e) (2006)); INST. OF MED. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., supra note 6, at 2; GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34208, COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH:  
BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND OVERVIEW 24 (2007). 
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gle federal agency has focused on CER as its primary activity.37  Private 
CER efforts have also been limited and poorly coordinated, with re-
sults often not made publicly available.38  Moreover, past CER activities 
have not employed common data infrastructures or followed consis-
tent research methodologies, complicating efforts to share the infor-
mation and build upon earlier work.39 
B.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
In what was hailed as an initial “down payment”40 for a national 
CER program, the Recovery Act of 2009 provided $1.1 billion in fi-
nancial support for CER, allocated among the Department of Health 
and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, and AHRQ.41  
This funding was an unprecedented public investment in CER.  The 
Recovery Act also provided new oversight by creating a federal-
commission-type entity, the Federal Coordinating Council for Com-
parative Effectiveness Research (the Federal CER Council), to coordi-
nate CER efforts among the federal agencies.42 
In addition, the Recovery Act directed the IOM to prepare a com-
prehensive report recommending national priorities for CER after con-
sidering input from health-system stakeholders.43  The resulting IOM re-
port, issued in June 2009, listed one hundred “top priority” CER topics.44 
 
37 See ELIZABETH DOCTEUR & ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN INST., HOW WILL COM-
PARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AFFECT THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE?:  TIMELY 
ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 5-6 (2010). 
38 Critics have called private CER studies conducted by drug and device manufactur-
ers biased because the studies tend to favor the sponsors’ products.  Also, health plans 
and other payers that conduct CER often do not make their studies available to the pub-
lic.  See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 116-17.  They are no 
doubt concerned that their competitors would free-ride on their efforts.  More generally, 
private CER efforts have suffered from weak coordination and lack of consistent research 
methods.  Steven Pearson, From Better Evidence to Better Care:  Using Comparative Effectiveness 
Research to Guide Practice and Policy, in BROOKINGS INST., supra note 29, at 58-59. 
39 FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13; INST. OF MED. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 43-51; Pearson, supra note 38, at 58-59. 
40 E.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, H.R. 1, THE “AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT 
ACT OF 2009”:  EXPLANATION OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (CER) PRO-
VISIONS, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/arra-cer-
provisions.pdf; Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 203. 
41 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-5, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 176-77.     
42 Recovery Act § 804, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
43 See Recovery Act, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 177. 
44 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 2.  
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C.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
In a rather abrupt departure from the federal-commission-type ap-
proach of the previous year’s legislation, PPACA abolished the Federal 
CER Council45 and replaced it with an entirely new oversight entity.  In-
stead of employing a purely public oversight model, the new structure 
cedes significant authority to private interests.  A new private nonprofit 
corporation, the PCOR Institute, will manage the nation’s CER pro-
gram.46  Various government officials, such as a representative from the 
National Institutes of Health, will hold seats on the PCOR Institute’s 
governing board.47  The majority of seats, however, are designated for 
private stakeholders, including representatives of patients, health care 
providers, drug and device manufacturers, and health insurers.48 
The statute empowers the PCOR Institute to establish national 
CER priorities and to enter into contracts with government agencies 
and private entities for carrying out various research projects.49  To as-
sist in these efforts, the PCOR Institute may appoint expert advisory 
panels.50  It is further tasked with developing a standing committee for 
improving the methodological standards applied to funded CER in-
vestigations.51  Also, the PCOR Institute must ensure appropriate peer 
review for research that it supports.52 
 
45 PPACA § 6302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 note (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
46 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e. 
47 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f). 
48 The members of the PCOR Institute’s governing board are to include the Direc-
tor of the National Institutes of Health and the Director of the AHRQ (or their desig-
nees).  Id.  In addition, the Comptroller General of the United States is to appoint ad-
ditional members as follows:  (1) three members representing patients and health care 
consumers, (2) five members representing physicians and other health care providers, 
(3) three members representing private payers, (4) three members representing drug 
and device manufacturers, (5) one member representing quality-improvement or in-
dependent-health-services researchers, and (6) two members representing the federal 
government or the states, including at least one member representing a federal agency 
or federal health program.  Id.  The initial board of governors, selected by the 
Comptroller General, includes officials from powerful drug and device firms Johnson 
& Johnson, Medtronic, and Pfizer, and representatives from influential payers Blue-
Cross BlueShield and Xerox.  Press Release, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 
Announces Appointments to New Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
(PCORI) Board of Governors (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/press/ 
pcori2010sep23.html. 
49 PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2). 
50 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(4). 
51 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2). 
52 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(7). 
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In allocating CER funds, the PCOR Institute will have significant 
resources at its disposal.  Transfers from the Medicare program trust 
funds, as well as revenue from a new tax on health plans, will finance a 
new CER trust fund.53  The amount available starts at $10 million in 
2010 but increases each year to reach an estimated $500 million per 
year by 2013–2014.54  However, no expenditures may be made from 
this trust fund after 2019.55  Importantly, PPACA precludes the PCOR 
Institute from using CER to make coverage determinations or to de-
velop practice guidelines and, similarly, sets narrow limits on federal 
health plans’ ability to use CER for reimbursement decisions, as ex-
plained in further detail below.56 
D.  Definitional Issues 
The new laws fail to clarify many details about the national CER 
program.  First of all, it is not entirely certain what CER means.  The 
Recovery Act did not expressly define the term.57  Using the related 
term “comparative clinical effectiveness research,” PPACA offers a 
seemingly straightforward definition:  “research evaluating and com-
paring health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and bene-
fits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items.”58 
Nonetheless, questions remain.  Does the inclusion of “services” 
and “items” within the definition mean that entire health care deli-
very systems, not just specific treatments, may be compared?  For ex-
ample, could a funded study investigate whether a difference in effec-
tiveness exists when a physician delivers the same underlying 
treatment, such as the use of beta-blockers for chronic heart disease, 
under a traditional fee-for-service system versus managed care?  Even 
 
53 Id. § 6301(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-2. 
54 Id. § 6301(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9511; see also AM. ASS’N OF MED. COLLS., SUMMARY OF 
PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH PROVISIONS 11 (2010) (discussing funding for 
the PCOR trust fund); COAL. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, HEALTH REFORM:  WHAT IT 
MEANS FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 3 (2010), available at http://www.chsr.org/ 
CHSRReformSummary.pdf (estimating $500 million in funding per year by 2013); Alex 
Nussbaum et al., Obamacare’s Cost Scalpel, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 2010, at 64, 64 (same). 
55 PPACA § 6301(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9511. 
56 See infra Section I.F. 
57 The Recovery Act described CER only indirectly, and through broad, open-
ended language, such as “research that compares the clinical outcomes, effectiveness, 
and appropriateness of items, services, and procedures that are used to prevent, diag-
nose, or treat diseases, disorders, and other health conditions.”  Recovery Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 177 (2009). 
58 PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a). 
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more important, does this definition contemplate comparison of the 
costs of different treatments?59 
Of course, some degree of imprecision in the statutory definition of 
CER might be useful.  Perhaps Congress meant to avoid a rigid, inflexi-
ble approach and leave some discretion to regulators about which as-
pects of CER to emphasize in different circumstances.  Nonetheless, the 
definitional imprecision creates considerable ambiguity during the crit-
ical rollout phase of the new legislation.  It also enables lawmakers to 
avoid, perhaps indefinitely, directly addressing hard but critically impor-
tant policy choices, such as whether CER should look at treatment costs. 
The definitional problems should not be surprising.  CER has 
been an evolving concept, and it continues to mean different things 
to different stakeholders.  In recent years, various public and private 
entities have developed numerous, and not always consistent, defini-
tions of CER.60 
In some respects, CER is merely the latest variation of the evidence-
based medicine paradigm that has taken hold in medical practice over 
the past two decades.61  However, CER involves more than just evidence-
 
59 See infra Section I.E. 
60 The Federal CER Council defined CER as  
the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the benefits and harms of 
different interventions and strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor 
health conditions in “real world” settings.  The purpose of this research is to 
improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based in-
formation to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to 
their expressed needs, about which interventions are most effective for which 
patients under specific circumstances. 
FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.  The IOM defined CER somewhat 
differently, through more of a public health orientation.  The IOM definition expressly 
included population health, not just individual patient experiences, in describing CER as 
the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms 
of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condi-
tion or to improve the delivery of care.  The purpose of CER is to assist con-
sumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy makers to make informed decisions 
that will improve health care at both the individual and population levels.  
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 13 (emphasis added).  Meanwhile, 
the Congressional Budget Office had earlier defined CER as “a rigorous evaluation of 
the impact of different options that are available for treating a given medical condition 
for a particular set of patients.”  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.  For a com-
prehensive list of varying CER definitions that public and private entities adopted in 
recent years, see INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 34-36 & tbl.2-1. 
61 “Evidence-based medicine” looks to the results of clinical trials and comprehen-
sive data analysis involving large populations of patients to guide individual treatment 
decisions.  It favors reliance on this type of information rather than physicians’ ten-
dencies to make treatment decisions based on anecdotal reports from peers, unsyste-
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based medicine’s preference for using hard data over practitioner intui-
tion and isolated clinical experiences.  It is easiest to understand CER 
by addressing what it is not—how it differs from conventional medical 
research.  First, most conceptions of CER stress the comparative aspects 
of the work, the rigorous evaluation of how different treatments fare 
relative to each other.  CER thus differs from traditional evidence-based 
medicine studies, such as clinical effectiveness or simply efficacy investiga-
tions, which look at an intervention in a more isolated fashion and ob-
serve whether it produces any therapeutic benefit.62 
A second distinguishing feature of CER is the pragmatic focus on 
what happens under real world clinical conditions.  Traditional clinical 
efficacy studies typically occur under highly controlled, artificial cir-
cumstances.  Subjects usually receive the exact same interventions in 
the same uniform manner.  Also, the traditional studies often exclude 
individuals with additional medical problems, or who take multiple 
medications, as well as individuals of varying age, gender, and health 
backgrounds.63  Investigators apply these standardization techniques 
and rigid eligibility criteria to isolate the effect of the studied interven-
tion.64  This narrow focus furthers scientific understanding of general 
disease etiology and, in the case of investigational drugs and devices, 
helps more efficiently satisfy the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)’s regulatory approval criteria.65  However, this means that tradi-
 
matic observations from isolated clinical experiences, observations during medical-
education training, and other less rigorous information sources.  See Evidence-Based 
Med. Working Grp., Evidence-Based Medicine:  A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of 
Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420-25 (1992). 
62 Sometimes “efficacy” and “effectiveness” are used interchangeably, but there is a 
technical distinction.  Efficacy studies test the given treatment under ideal, uniform 
conditions that try to minimize the influence of other factors.  Effectiveness studies test 
the treatment under “messier” conditions, such as patients of different health status 
and varying procedures for administering the treatment, to better represent the cir-
cumstances of actual clinical practice.  See JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 4-5 (discussing 
the difference between “effectiveness” and “efficacy”). 
63 See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-21; JACOBSON, supra note 
36, at 5. 
64 See Common Questions About Clinical Trials, YALE CANCER CENTER, http:// 
www.yalecancercenter.org/trials/questions.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Enrol-
ling participants with similar characteristics helps to ensure that the results of the trial 
will be due to what is under study and not other factors.”). 
65 Investigational new drugs typically undergo different phases of clinical-trial test-
ing to satisfy FDA approval criteria.  Phase I studies establish levels of tolerance to de-
termine safe dosage levels.  If deemed nontoxic, a drug passes into Phase II, where it is 
tested to demonstrate general efficacy and relative safety.  Phase III studies involve ex-
panded controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials and more comprehensive evalua-
tions of general efficacy and safety.  See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2010) (explaining the 
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tional research studies are not always persuasive when it comes to 
making actual decisions for real patients.66  In contrast, CER inten-
tionally draws in a wider range of subjects.67 
Third, CER often evaluates customary treatments alongside new ap-
proaches, whereas traditional studies focus more heavily on new inter-
ventions alone.  CER studies can thus provide critical information that 
calls into question longstanding medical treatments68 or, alternatively, 
that challenges the assumption that “what is newest” is usually “the 
best.”69  Although both can involve looking at existing treatments, 
CER should not be confused with FDA postmarketing (or Phase IV) 
studies.70  Phase IV studies typically look to safety and efficacy issues 
with a single product, rather than comparing the effectiveness of dif-
ferent treatments as ordinarily involved in CER.71 
 
phases of an FDA investigation).  However, the FDA typically does not analyze how 
treatments compare to each other in terms of relative effectiveness.  See Alec B. 
O’Connor, Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability into the FDA Approval Process, 303 
JAMA 979, 979-80 (2010) (arguing that the FDA should consider comparative effec-
tiveness research in its approval decisions so that new but inferior treatments do not 
replace established treatments); see also Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of 
Human Drugs and Medical Devices:  A Case Study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobio-
technology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 601-02 (2009) (discussing criteria the FDA typi-
cally considers during its approval process for medical devices). 
66 See JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 4-5 (discussing how tightly controlled trials are 
not always applicable to real-life scenarios); Bryan R. Luce et al., Rethinking Randomized 
Clinical Trials for Comparative Effectiveness Research:  The Need for Transformational Change, 
151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 206, 208 (2009) (arguing that tightly controlled studies 
“do not reach their potential value for health care decision making”).  
67 CER “relaxes the strict exclusionary criteria that are typically required in [tra-
ditional] trials, in order to assess the treatment in the wide range of patients and en-
vironments in which the product is actually used.”  JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 5 
(emphasis added). 
68 For example, a recent comparative study of resuscitation treatments found that 
chest compression and breathing—the traditional resuscitation technique practiced 
for many years—was generally no more effective than chest compression alone.  See 
Thomas D. Rea et al., CPR with Chest Compression Alone or with Rescue Breathing, 365 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 423, 432 (2010).  Also, chest compression alone had better outcomes in 
several patient subgroups.  Both treatment interventions studied involved trained dis-
patchers assisting bystanders, who performed the procedures.  Id. 
69 JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 1. 
70 For certain drugs, the FDA can condition its approval on the manufacturer 
conducting additional Phase IV studies after the drug is marketed and adopted in clin-
ical use.  The aim of these postapproval studies is to gather more information about 
the drug once it is used in broader populations and under different conditions than 
the preapproval clinical trials.  See 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2010) (detailing the FDA’s au-
thority to require Phase IV studies). 
71 See id. (explaining the goals of Phase IV studies); JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 5 
(distinguishing between Phase IV and effectiveness studies); Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars 
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E.  Comparative Effectiveness Versus Cost-Effectiveness 
What, ultimately, does it mean for one treatment to be more “ef-
fective” than another?  In the political debates over health care 
reform, opponents charged that CER would inherently involve some 
form of cost-effectiveness review, resulting in coverage denial for ex-
pensive treatments and treatments for disabled patients and other 
vulnerable groups.72  Even after the passage of PPACA, the degree to 
which CER differs—if it should differ at all—from cost-effectiveness 
analysis continues to create controversy.  Cost-effectiveness analysis con-
siders gains in health from a treatment compared to the expense of 
offering the treatment (for example, years of life saved per dollar 
spent).73  This contrasts with pure clinical-effectiveness analysis, which 
looks solely to therapeutic outcomes of a treatment (for example, sur-
vival rates).74  With CER, however, no clear consensus exists about 
whether one should compare treatments based on their pure clinical 
effectiveness, their cost-effectiveness, or some other metric. 
PPACA seems to take a pure clinical-effectiveness approach.  It 
uses the key term “comparative clinical effectiveness research” and de-
scribes research that looks at “clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits,” 
but nowhere does the statute mention comparing respective costs.75  
No doubt to make the legislation more politically palatable in light of 
the concerns about CER and rationing, Congress avoided express dis-
cussion of cost comparisons.  Indeed, “cost or value of health services 
is conspicuously absent from the statutory definition of comparative 
clinical effectiveness.”76  Yet rather than siding squarely against incorp-
orating cost-effectiveness analysis into CER, lawmakers simply obfus-
cated, but did not preclude, the possibility.  PPACA does not expressly 
 
of a New Evidentiary Paradigm:  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 488-89 (2010) (discussing postmarket study methodologies).   
72 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Opinion, ObamaCare Is All About Rationing, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 19, 2009, at A15 (arguing that “rationing health care is central” to President Ob-
ama’s strategy to reduce health care costs); see also infra Section I.F. 
73 See COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE xviii (Marthe Gold et al. eds., 
1996). 
74 See, e.g., Adrian F. Hernandez et al., Clinical Effectiveness of Beta-Blockers in Heart 
Failure, 53 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 184, 189 (2009) (studying the mortality rate in pa-
tients with heart failure who subsequently took beta-blockers). 
75 PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
76 COAL. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, supra note 54, at 7. 
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prohibit the research from encompassing cost comparisons,77 and 
other parts of the statute imply that government-funded CER could 
occasionally involve cost-effectiveness analysis.78  Indeed, key health 
policy advisors in the Obama Administration say they hope that the 
research will augment meaningful cost control for the health care sys-
tem by identifying when the benefits of health care are not sufficient 
to justify the costs.79 
The IOM’s recent report on national priorities for CER, required 
by the Recovery Act,80 further illustrates the confusion about the gov-
ernment’s CER agenda and cost-effectiveness.  The IOM lists one 
hundred high-priority topics for CER studies.81  In many cases, the re-
port discusses possible CER investigations solely in terms of clinical-
effectiveness comparisons.  But in some instances, the IOM report 
calls for comparing both the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of different interventions, such as in the discussion of research eva-
luating medical-management techniques for type 2 diabetes.82  It is not 
always clear why the IOM report expressly mentions cost-effectiveness 
for certain priority topics but not others.  Congress did not repudiate 
the IOM report’s approach in enacting PPACA, and the IOM report 
will presumably continue to wield significant influence with regulators 
in implementing the national CER program. 
Incorporating regular cost-effectiveness review into a national CER 
program has significant policy advantages.  When considering whether 
one treatment is “better” or “more effective” than another, therapeutic 
and cost considerations become inextricably intertwined.  Including 
 
77 See id. (noting that PPACA’s comparative effectiveness provisions do not expli-
citly proscribe comparative cost-effectiveness research). 
78 For example, the statute precludes the PCOR Institute from using “a dollars-
per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life be-
cause of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is 
cost effective or recommended.”  PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-
1(e) (emphasis added).  Because the law singles out only this particular form of cost-
effectiveness analysis, it leaves open the possibility that other cost-effectiveness compar-
isons that do not adjust for quality of life in such a manner might be permissible as 
part of government-funded CER. 
79 See, e.g., Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 2, at 601-02 (identifying the CER initia-
tives, in the view of the former White House OMB Director and the OMB’s special 
health policy advisor, as part of the important “cost control elements” of the new 
health care reform legislation); Nussbaum et al., supra note 54, at 64-66 (noting that 
Obama’s advisors view CER as a tool to pry savings out of the health care system).  
80 See supra Section I.B. 
81 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 3 tbl.S-1 (noting the 
areas of highest priority for CER studies). 
82 See id. at 8 tbl.1.   
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cost-effectiveness analysis as part of CER does not dictate that treat-
ment decisions should be made solely or even significantly because of 
cost.  But it at least ensures that decisionmakers have a more accurate 
understanding of the stakes in choosing between treatments.83 
However, physicians have generally been wary of a national CER 
program featuring regular cost-effectiveness review.  Many fear that 
CER will facilitate crude cost-cutting.84  The uncertain boundaries 
between CER and cost-effectiveness analysis intensify these concerns.  
For example, the American Medical Association (AMA) explained to 
its members that it had supported the Recovery Act’s CER provi-
sions, which conspicuously avoided mentioning cost comparisons, 
because such support was consistent with the AMA’s overall goal of 
ensuring that “clinical considerations drive CER analysis” and that 
“cost-effectiveness is subordinate to the consideration of safety and 
clinical effectiveness.”85 
F.  Limitations on Use of CER 
To minimize concerns about rationing, Congress imposed signifi-
cant limitations on the use of CER.  PPACA restricts utilizing CER in 
federal health care program reimbursement.  The statute prohibits 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services from making Medicare 
coverage decisions “solely on the basis” of CER.86  It further provides 
that if CER is used to inform a coverage decision, the Medicare pro-
gram cannot use the evidence to assert that some treatments have less 
effectiveness because they primarily help patients with an alleged low-
 
83 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19-20 (noting the challenges of 
choosing a research option and how that affects treatment choices). 
84 See, e.g., FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 57 (summarizing phy-
sician input from listening sessions and public-comment solicitations and noting the 
concern that factoring cost into CER “could lead to limiting access and benefits . . . [or 
be used for] looking for cheaper treatments”); Alvin I. Mushlin & Hassan Ghomrawi, 
Health Care Reform and the Need for Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
e6(1), e6(1) (2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0912651 (“[T]here 
are fears that patients will be denied effective care on the basis of CER’s findings.”). 
85 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 40, at 2 (emphasis added).  However, not all physi-
cian groups oppose integrating cost-effectiveness analysis with CER.  The American 
College of Physicians has advocated that any national CER program should develop 
cost-effectiveness information as well.  See Am. Coll. of Physicians, Information on Cost-
Effectiveness:  An Essential Product of a National Comparative Effectiveness Program, 148 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 956, 956 (2008) (calling for government-sponsored CER and 
cost-effectiveness research). 
86 PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(b)(2) (West Supp. 
1A 2010). 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2167 
er quality of life.87  Also, the Medicare program cannot use CER “in a 
manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or termi-
nally ill individual as of lower value” than the needs of other patients.88  
Moreover, the statute essentially treats CER as mere advisory informa-
tion by making clear that practice guidelines and coverage recommen-
dations need not incorporate findings from CER.89  These constraints 
parallel and, in certain areas, expand upon earlier limitations imposed 
upon use of CER under the Recovery Act90 and the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.91 
These limitations make it difficult for governmental health care 
programs to use CER in their financing decisions.  For example, under 
the current statutory criteria for Medicare reimbursement, services 
generally qualify for payment so long as they are “reasonable and neces-
sary.”92  There is usually no need to demonstrate that a covered treat-
ment offers better clinical or cost-effectiveness than other treatments.93  
 
87 Id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(a). 
88 Id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(c)(1).  Similarly, PPACA 
prohibits the PCOR Institute from “develop[ing] or employ[ing] a dollars-per-quality 
adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an 
individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effec-
tive or recommended” and imposes similar constraints on federal health programs.  Id. 
sec. 6301(c), § 1182(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(e). 
89 See id. secs. 6301(a), 10602, § 1181(d)(8)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(d)(8) 
(A)(iv) (requiring that the PCOR Institute ensure that research findings  “do not include 
practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment, or policy recommendations”). 
90 See Recovery Act § 804(g)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8(g)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010) 
(stating that the law should not be interpreted to permit the Federal CER Council “to 
mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies” for any health plan, public or 
private).  The Recovery Act also provided that the Federal CER Council’s recommen-
dations were not to “be construed as mandates or clinical guidelines for payment, cov-
erage, or treatment.”  Id. § 804(g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8(g)(2). 
91 See Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1013(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2441 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(b)(2006)) (limiting the scope of changes that can be made based 
on effectiveness research).  The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Mod-
ernization Act of 2003 provided funds to the AHRQ to perform comparative clinical 
effectiveness research on various items and services.  Id. § 1013(e), 117 Stat. at 2441 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(e)).  However, the statute also made clear 
that the AHRQ Director should “not mandate national standards of clinical practice or 
quality health care standards” and further required that the AHRQ Director provide 
notice of this prohibition in any recommendations resulting from the funded research.  
Id. § 1013(b). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)–(B).  
93 Under the “Least Costly Alternative” (LCA) policy, Medicare allowed its con-
tractors, when making local coverage determinations, to limit the amount paid for 
comparable treatment to the lower cost alternative and to not cover the excess pay-
ment for the more expensive intervention.  For the most part, Medicare contractors 
applied these rules to reimbursement for certain drugs and devices.  See MEDICARE 
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The Medicare program has tried to incorporate cost-effectiveness as an 
additional criterion for coverage in the past, but the proposed rule-
making generated considerable controversy and has, for the most part, 
been abandoned or limited.94  The availability of more CER informa-
tion, to be used on a purely elective basis, is therefore unlikely to 
change things materially.  Other criteria in addition to CER must be 
used to justify changes in Medicare coverage; otherwise the Medicare 
program invites challenges that it has run afoul of PPACA by making 
coverage decisions solely on the basis of CER.95  Coverage denials of 
treatments that CER reveals have low effectiveness value can also be 
challenged—depending on the clinical populations involved—for im-
permissibly discounting the value of such treatments for the elderly, 
disabled, and terminally ill.96  Also, practice guidelines and coverage 
recommendations need not pay special heed to CER.97  As a result, the 
link between what CER reveals is comparatively effective and what 
federal health care programs pay for will remain quite tenuous. 
It is similarly uncertain whether CER will materially affect the 
reimbursement practices of private health plans.  The Medicare pro-
gram traditionally has played a “first mover” role, with private payers 
 
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN 
MEDICARE 6-7 (2010) (discussing the LCA and functional equivalence policies behind 
Medicare’s reference pricing strategy).  However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
struck down Medicare’s attempts to use the LCA policy to limit reimbursement of 
DuoNeb, an inhalation drug used in treatment of chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease.  See Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  The implica-
tions of the decision for the entire LCA policy are unclear, but apparently as a result of 
the court ruling, Medicare has instructed its contractors to stop applying the LCA rules 
when processing reimbursement for drugs covered under Medicare’s Part B (Medical 
Insurance) program.  See CMS Instructs Contractors to Rescind All LCA Provisions in Current 
LCDs, HEALTH POL’Y WKLY. (AmerisourceBergen Specialty Grp., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 
30, 2010, https://www.iononline.com/app/Documents/Health%20Policy%20Weekly/ 
2010/April%2030,%202010.pdf. 
94 See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services 
Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4308-09 
(proposed Jan. 30, 1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405) (proposing cost-
effectiveness as a criterion).  But see Medicare Program; Procedures for Making Na-
tional Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619, 22,620 (Apr. 27, 1999) (withdrawing 
proposed rule).  See generally Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, But Cannot, Consider Cost:  
Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2005) (arguing that 
Congress must require Medicare to consider cost-effectiveness). 
95 See PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(b) (West Supp. 1A 
2010) (prohibiting using CER as the only basis for denying coverage). 
96 See id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(c)–(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(c)–(d). 
97 See id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8)(A) (prohibit-
ing the inclusion of practice or coverage recommendations in the research findings). 
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following Medicare reimbursement policies.98 If the Medicare pro-
gram is statutorily hampered from incorporating CER more robustly 
into reimbursement decisions, then there will be little innovation for 
private health plans to follow.  Moreover, Congress included express 
language in the statute making clear that private health plans can re-
gard CER as they see fit and have no obligation to change their policies 
based on what the PCOR Institute thinks should be done.99  The statute 
takes a hard line to ensure that CER plays only a limited, passive in-
formational role, providing, for example, that the materials used to 
disseminate CER “shall . . . not be construed as mandates, guidelines, 
or recommendations for payment, coverage, or treatment.”100 
Other sections of PPACA, unrelated to the new national CER pro-
gram, take cautious steps toward more innovative approaches to 
health care financing.  For example, the statute creates a new Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS).101  This entity will test new reim-
bursement methods that may help control costs “while preserving or 
enhancing quality of care.”102  The new law also encourages experi-
mentation with global payments to hospital-physician groups for servic-
es bundled together around entire episodes of care.103  In addition, the 
law creates the Independent Medicare Advisory Board, an independent 
panel with limited authority to recommend spending reductions in the 
Medicare program.104  But it is unclear whether the statutory restrictions 
 
98 Paul N. Van de Water notes,   
As the largest U.S. purchaser and regulator of health care, Medicare exerts a 
major influence on the rest of the health care system. . . . Its reimbursement 
and coverage policies have been widely adopted by private insurers and other 
public programs.  For example, many private insurers follow Medicare’s lead 
in approving coverage of new medical technologies.   
Paul N. Van de Water, Medicare Changes Can Complement Health Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, 3 ( July 31, 2008), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa= 
view&id=563. 
99 PPACA states that its CER provisions are not to be construed “to permit the 
[PCOR] Institute to mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any 
public or private payer.”  PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181( j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e( j) (em-
phasis added). 
100 Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(a)(2)(B). 
101 See id. § 3021(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(a). 
102 Id.  
103 See id. § 3023, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4. 
104 See id. sec. 3403, § 1899A, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk.  The Independent Medicare 
Advisory Board has authority to submit recommendations to reduce the per capita 
growth rate of Medicare spending if spending exceeds a targeted growth rate.  Id. 
sec. 3403, § 1899A(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk(b).  But the Board cannot submit pro-
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on the use of CER would continue to apply to such demonstra-
tion/innovation initiatives.105  Accordingly, the door has been opened 
only partially to experimentation with CER and federal health care 
reimbursement policy.  In any event, these demonstration/innovation 
initiatives will initially be limited in scope and take time to develop.  
Plus, considerable doubt remains about whether these initiatives have 
sufficient strength to take hold over the long term and lead to compre-
hensive change.106 
II.  INFORMATION GAPS AND WHAT DRIVES MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 
This Article’s attention to CER’s probable translation problems is 
not meant to be a critique of CER generally.  Part of the reason for 
disappointment about how the national CER program is taking shape 
concerns the tremendous missed opportunities.  The health care sys-
tem critically needs effective CER.  And the very reasons why—that 
 
posals that will ration care, increase revenues, or change benefits.  See id. sec. 3403, 
§ 1899A(c)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) (“The proposal shall not in-
clude any recommendations to ration health care, raise revenue or Medicare beneficiary 
premiums . . . .”); Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform—Why Medicare 
Matters, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2010) (“The [Independent Medicare Advisory 
B]oard’s role is carefully circumscribed . . . [and] it is expressly prohibited from recom-
mending increasing revenues; changing benefits, including patient cost sharing; or al-
tering program eligibility.”). 
105 For example, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation might want to 
test payment models in which coverage decisions are based solely on CER.  To do so, it 
would presumably need authority to ignore the statutory restriction on using CER in 
this manner.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  PPACA does give the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services authority to waive various Medicare and Medicaid statu-
tory requirements in order to test innovative reimbursement  models.  See PPACA sec. 
2001(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(gg).  But in exercising this waiver authority, the Secretary 
would need to expressly waive the CER limitation provisions.  Given how controversies 
over linking CER to reimbursement led to such statutory restrictions in the first place, 
it is not clear that the Secretary would want to take the politically unpalatable step of 
reopening such debates by waiving the CER limitation provisions.   
106 See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 104, at 102-03 (casting doubt on whether enough 
physicians will participate in the bundled payment initiatives with hospitals and describ-
ing how the Independent Medicare Advisory Board’s impact will likely be limited); Da-
vid A. Hyman, Follow the Money:  Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Everything Else, 
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370, 381 (2010) (observing that the Board has limited authority to 
make fast-track recommendations about physician payments and questioning whether 
the Board will be able to make significant cost-cutting recommendations without creat-
ing a crippling political backlash); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advi-
sory Board, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 104-05 (2010) (noting that the Board will most 
likely focus on cuts to Medicare Advantage plans in the early years, not significant 
changes in physician reimbursement, and also observing that “[m]any questions re-
main about how, and indeed whether, the [Board] will work”). 
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solid effectiveness evidence currently plays only a limited role in med-
ical decisionmaking and that many nonclinical factors influence the 
choice of treatment—underscore the difficulties in engaging physi-
cians to better utilize CER. 
Because of medicine’s hallowed scientific traditions, the common 
misconception is that scientific evidence supports customary practices 
and that physicians can consistently identify right and wrong treat-
ments for most conditions.  In reality, uncertainty pervades medi-
cine.107  Thus, the much repeated story of advice given to a medical 
school graduating class:  “[H]alf of what we teach you here is wrong—
unfortunately, we don’t know which half.”108 
Achieving consensus among physicians on a best treatment is of-
ten difficult.  For a particular illness, many possible care pathways may 
exist, and even the same treatment can present different benefits and 
harms for otherwise similar patients due to patient-specific responses 
and genetic differences.109  Furthermore, nonclinical factors, such as 
reimbursement incentives, heavily influence physician decision-
making.110  As a result, the concept of “standard of care” varies signifi-
cantly, and the lack of good comparative effectiveness data further 
fragments customary standards.  Studies suggest that when evidence 
about comparative effectiveness is weak, treatment variations tend to 
be greater between physicians.111 
Another common misconception concerns the degree of evidence 
needed for a treatment to become established as custom.  Many 
treatments diffuse into practice without testing through randomized 
clinical trials or other rigorous evaluations.  New surgical and diagnos-
tic procedures generally do not require the approval of the FDA or 
other regulatory agencies before they are introduced into regular clin-
 
107 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 117 (noting the 
existence of “significant evidence gaps” in medicine and the “[u]ncertainty about clin-
ical effectiveness applies to new and old services”). 
108 Lisa Sanders, Medicine’s Progress, One Setback at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, 
at SM29; see also Jerome Groopman & Pamela Hartzband, Op-Ed., Why “Quality” Care Is 
Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at A13 (attributing a similar quotation to Dr. David 
Sackett, “a pioneer of [the] ‘evidence-based medicine’” movement). 
109 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharm-
acogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753, 753-55 (2006) (outlining the regulatory issues 
raised by the genetic variability of drug response). 
110 See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text. 
111 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he extent of the variation in 
treatments may be greatest when evidence about their relative effectiveness is lack-
ing.”); McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 10 (suggesting an absence of CER find-
ings is “partly to blame” for greater geographic variation in treatment patterns).   
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ical practice.112  The FDA approval process for drugs and devices, 
meanwhile, yields only limited information concerning comparative 
effectiveness.  For new drugs, clinical trial testing typically focuses on 
satisfying the FDA approval criteria of safety and general effectiveness, 
not relative effectiveness.113  Indeed, because of the limited information 
generated, commentators have called for new labeling rules that would 
advise physicians and patients that although the FDA may have ap-
proved a new drug, no evidence exists that it actually works better than 
other medications.114  The FDA approval process for devices yields even 
more limited data about a product’s relative value.115 
Clinical practice guidelines serve as another potential source of ef-
fectiveness information.  However, many existing guidelines suffer 
from potential bias, advancing the narrow interests of specialty physi-
cian groups, drug companies, and other interested parties.116  More 
problematically, clinical practice guidelines often lack a firm founda-
tion of comparative effectiveness evidence.  Rather than synthesizing 
hard data such as information generated from randomized clinical 
trials, many practice guidelines are more like consensus statements of 
professional opinion.117 
 
112 See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology:  Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Know-
ledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 447 (2002). 
113 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing the FDA new drug ap-
proval process). 
114 See Randall S. Stafford et al., New, But Not Improved?  Incorporating Comparative-
Effectiveness Information into FDA Labeling, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1230, 1232 (2009) (“In 
the absence of comparative data, drug and device labels should include a statement 
indicating that there is no evidence of the product’s superiority to other products.”). 
115 The FDA device-approval process typically gathers safety and effectiveness in-
formation only for high-risk devices and produces very little data about relative effec-
tiveness.  See Hearing on Strategies to Increase Information on Comparative Clinical Effective-
ness:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th 
Cong. 57 (2007) (statement of Mark Miller, Executive Director, Medicare Payment Ad-
visory Commission) (commenting that the FDA approval process does not generate 
comparative effectiveness evidence); see also O’Connor, supra note 65, at 979 (“The 
current FDA standards for approval fail to assess whether newly approved drugs and 
devices are less efficacious or less well-tolerated than existing alternatives.”). 
116 See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines—The Warped Incentives in the US 
Healthcare System 32-36 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
No. 181, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593133 (identifying flaws in the 
creation of practice guidelines). 
117 See, e.g., Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific Evidence Underlying the ACC/AHA Clini-
cal Practice Guidelines, 301 JAMA 831, 833-35 (2009) (finding that the American College 
of Cardiology and American Heart Association clinical practice guidelines show “con-
sistent gaps in evidence about medical practices”). 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2173 
Also, medical knowledge constantly changes as new treatments 
and technologies come down the pike.  It becomes quite challenging 
to perform adequate and still relevant assessments with so many mov-
ing targets.118  Another reason for information deficits concerning rel-
ative effectiveness is that public financing of CER in the United States 
has traditionally been limited, in contrast to other countries with 
more robust public CER programs.119 
Without the support of reliable comparative effectiveness informa-
tion, suboptimal medical decisionmaking can result.120  Even when 
physicians make treatment choices with the best intentions, informa-
tional deficits regarding relative effectiveness can lead to the selection 
of ineffective or even inappropriate care.121 
Even worse, and perhaps counterintuitively, it is not easy to reme-
dy the information gap simply by producing more and better evi-
dence.  In several instances, physicians did not change practice pat-
terns even after widely disseminated studies suggested that they were 
choosing inferior treatments.122  The common pattern is that “physi-
 
118 As the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has observed, new 
treatments often “disseminate quickly into routine medical care with little or no basis 
for knowing whether they outperform existing treatments, and to what extent.”  MEDI-
CARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 107. 
119 The United Kingdom’s National Health Service has perhaps the most well-
known, and controversial, public CER program.  The U.K. National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) provides comprehensive technology assess-
ment.  See Pearson, supra note 38, at 77 box A (describing the structure, function, and 
methods of NICE).  NICE reviews, which include cost-effectiveness analysis, heavily in-
fluence the treatments that the National Health Service covers.  Id. 
120 See Michael S. Lauer & Francis S. Collins, Using Science to Improve the Nation’s 
Health System, 303 JAMA 2182, 2182 (2010) (noting that, “[t]o the surprise of many,” 
drugs meant to treat cardiac arrhythmia led to increased rates of arrhythmic death). 
121 See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (“When specific evidence 
is lacking, clinicians have to rely on their clinical experience . . . [and] these decisions 
can result in less than optimal, and sometimes inappropriate, treatment choices.”).  
When solid comparative effectiveness evidence is lacking, less reliable information is 
left to fill the void.  “Unfortunately, the individual physician may be most impressed by 
observations made in his or her individual practice.  This source of evidence is noto-
riously vulnerable to bias and error.”  David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice:  
The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., May 1984, at 74, 81. 
122 For example, in 2007, the New England Journal of Medicine published the 
“COURAGE” (Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and Aggressive Drug 
Evaluation) study.  William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy With or Without PCI 
for Stable Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503 (2007).  The research concluded 
that heart surgery using stents to unclog blocked arteries, a common procedure, often 
was not more effective than simply treating the cardiac patients with drugs alone or 
trying drug treatment first and moving to stents only if complications remained.  Id.  at 
1509-11.  Many expected the research’s publication would lead to significantly de-
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cians, hospitals, and patients are slow to respond to new evidence of 
ineffectiveness.”123  Even information dissemination about safety con-
cerns can have weak influence on physician decisionmaking.  For ex-
ample, physicians have been known to pay little heed to the dire 
“black box” warnings that the FDA uses to alert physicians about newly 
discovered dangers associated with certain drugs.124 
Information dissemination has a modest impact at best because 
physicians receive and adopt the information in somewhat haphazard 
and idiosyncratic ways.125  Many other factors drive community physi-
cians’ decisionmaking apart from the underlying comparative effec-
tiveness data.  The way physicians are paid is a key influence.126  Finan-
cial incentives powerfully guide physician behavior by engaging and 
exploiting the individual’s economic self-interest, above and beyond 
technical appeals to clinical judgment.127  A physician’s initial profes-
sional education also has long-lasting impact, as physicians may exhi-
bit path dependence, adhering to treatment pathways and decision 
approaches learned during their medical school and residency train-
ing programs.128  Also, the views of respected local physician opinion 
 
creased use of stents, but after a brief decline in use of the procedure, stent implants 
began to increase again.  See Keith J. Winstein, A Simple Health-Care Fix Fizzles Out, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, at A1 (noting that stent implants “are now back at peak levels” and 
that such studies “have rarely altered medical practice”).  Part of the resistance to 
change may be because physicians and hospitals receive more favorable reimbursement 
for performing stent implants than for initiating drug therapy alone.  Also, a degree of 
path dependence makes physicians resistant to switching from previous practices. 
123 Thom Wilder, Despite Doubts About CER’s Impact, Studies Should Take Place, Re-
searcher Says, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 215-16 (Apr. 7, 2010). 
124 See Jerry H. Gurwitz, Editorial, Serious Adverse Drug Effects—Seeing the Trees 
Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414 (2006). 
125 See Noah, supra note 112, at 377 (“[W]e most certainly do not yet enjoy fully 
evidence-based medical practice.”). 
126 See Hyman, supra note 106, at 371-72 (“It is difficult to overstate the extent to 
which economic incentives explain the structure, performance, and pathologies of the 
American health care system.”). 
127 See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs:  Is There a 
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1746-47 (1987). 
128 See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein et al., The Effects of Physicians’ Training and Personality 
on Test Ordering for Ambulatory Patients, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1271, 1272 & tbl.1 (1984) 
(finding that physicians trained in medical schools with more academic focuses tended 
to order more tests than other physicians); Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judg-
ment?  False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 76-77 (2008) (observing that physicians’ willingness to dis-
regard evidence-based sources of information partly stems from their experiences as 
trainees in the hierarchical environment of residency training programs, “where the 
opinion of the attending physician is revered as authoritative” and, accordingly, crowds 
out other information sources). 
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leaders and the recommendations of physician peers can heavily sway 
community doctors’ treatment choices.129  Aggressive marketing by 
drug and device manufactures can also impact physicians’ treatment 
selection.130  Other influencing factors include physicians’ malpractice 
risk perceptions,131 the demands of patients and payers for certain 
products and services,132 physicians’ enthusiastic belief in new tech-
nology,133 and physicians’ intuition and judgment based on isolated 
clinical experiences.134 
III.  TRANSLATION BARRIERS 
While the health care system critically needs high-quality CER, 
many factors limit the ability to make productive use of the research.  
Some complications arise from the inherent cost and difficulty of de-
veloping high-quality research.  Perhaps even more importantly, even 
with very good CER available, physicians will be hesitant to change or 
adapt their practice patterns.  As already noted, some physicians view 
CER with deep suspicion as a vehicle for rationing expensive treat-
 
129 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 128, at 76 (“Studies document significant influ-
ence of peer opinions on clinical decision making . . . .”); Stephen B. Soumerai et al., 
Effect of Local Medical Opinion Leaders on Quality of Care for Acute Myocardial Infarction:  A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 279 JAMA 1358, 1362-63 (1998) (“[W]hen best practices 
are clearly defined . . . local opinion leaders can accelerate adoption of effective treat-
ments . . . .”); Jane M. Young et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting Evidence-Based 
Surgery, 138 ARCHIVES SURGERY 785, 789-91 (2003) (finding that most surgeons believe 
opinion leaders influence surgical practice). 
130 See DOCTEUR & BERENSON, supra note 37, at 3 (arguing that standard medical 
practice reflects such marketing, among other considerations, rather than medical 
evidence). 
131 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 
JAMA 2789, 2790 (2008) (“Medical malpractice laws and the resultant defensive medi-
cine also contribute to overutilization [of health care].”).  
132 See id. at 2790-91 (attributing part of the overutilization of health care to direct-
to-consumer marketing); Wilder, supra note 123, at 216 (discussing how health care 
providers were slow to abandon use of high-dose chemotherapy followed by autologous 
bone marrow transplants for breast cancer despite mounting evidence of the treat-
ment’s ineffectiveness, due in part to patient demand).   
133 See infra Section III.E (discussing how the “technological imperative” can lead 
to the premature adoption of medical procedures and technology); see also CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 4 (listing “enthusiasm for the newest technology” as 
one of the reasons for the spread of new medical technologies despite a lack of proof 
of their effectiveness).  
134 See Alain Enthoven, What Medical Care Is and Isn’t, in CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET 
AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 135, 135-36 (2d ed. 1998) (excerpting A. ENTHO-
VEN, HEALTH PLAN:  THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COSTS OF 
HEALTH CARE 1-9 (1980)). 
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ments.135  Professional self-interest as well as legitimate therapeutic 
concerns for patients provide additional reasons for physician resis-
tance.  Current legal rules and policy approaches fail to provide suffi-
cient incentives for incorporating CER into regular clinical practice 
and may even discourage physicians from doing so. 
A.  Vagueness and Mission Creep 
The failure to provide a more precise, consistent legislative and 
regulatory definition for CER136 creates vagueness concerns, increas-
ing the risk of fragmented work that lacks common methods and 
priorities.  The confusion over whether CER should include thorough 
cost-effectiveness analysis is one example.137  A comprehensive review 
of CER drug studies appearing in medical journals to date found that 
the investigations often did not consider cost (or safety, for that mat-
ter),138 making the research arguably incomplete and raising concerns 
of publication bias.139  Ideally, the new national CER program would 
require that government-funded studies use uniform methodologies 
to facilitate data sharing and improve the quality of the research.  Un-
fortunately, the ambiguous legislative and regulatory guidance so far140 
leaves things unclear by not precluding the possibility that CER could 
include cost comparisons, but also by not providing consistent, force-
ful direction as to appropriate methodologies or even when such cost 
comparisons should be included. 
Related to vagueness issues are “mission-creep” concerns.  Physi-
cians can be expected to question the new national CER program as 
unfocused and overly broad, extending to investigations that do not 
directly advance the originally understood goals of CER.  The con-
gressionally mandated IOM report141 exemplifies these problems.  The 
 
135 See supra Section I.E. 
136 See supra Section I.D.  
137 See supra Section I.E. 
138 See generally Michael Hochman & Danny McCormick, Characteristics of Published 
Comparative Effectiveness Studies of Medications, 303 JAMA 951 (2010).   
139 Publication bias describes the greater likelihood that studies showing a signifi-
cant positive result will receive publication opportunities (or are published at all) than 
equally well-conducted studies that report a negative result.  This can lead to a dis-
counting of costs and risks and an overrating of published treatments.  See generally 
Lakshmi Sridharan & Philip Greenland, Editorial, Editorial Policies and Publication Bias:  
The Importance of Negative Studies, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1022 (2009). 
140 See supra Section I.E. 
141 See supra Section I.B. 
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IOM identified one hundred high-priority topics for CER.142  Rather 
than head-to-head treatment comparisons, about half of the recom-
mendations concern general health care delivery-system issues, such as 
evaluating different strategies to delineate barriers to care, especially for 
members of populations that experience health disparities.143  Such re-
search, although worthy on its own terms, seems a bit far afield from 
helping physicians choose between specific treatment options, suppo-
sedly one of the main purposes of the new national CER program.144  
The inclusion of research that gets beyond head-to-head treatment 
comparisons will no doubt disappoint physicians wanting information 
more immediately relevant to their clinical circumstances.145 
In part, the new CER agenda may appear overly broad, and seem-
ingly untethered, because of the historic opportunities created by the 
record governmental funding.  With so much money at stake, it should 
not surprise that diverse interest groups have clamored and lobbied 
heavily for some share of the new CER funds.  When the IOM elicited 
input from stakeholders on national priorities for CER, as required un-
der the Recovery Act, it received over 2600 nominations from more 
than 1700 respondents within three weeks.146  But the more diffuse the 
CER research agenda becomes, and the more it covers general health 
policy matters, the less likely that the information generated will com-
mand the attention of physicians practicing in the clinical trenches. 
B.  Costly Studies That Raise More Questions Than Answers 
Another set of complications concerns the significant cost of con-
ducting CER and the uncertain persuasiveness of the data generated. 
 
142 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 3 tbl.S-1. 
143 See id. 
144 According to the Federal CER Council, “The purpose of [CER] is to provide in-
formation that helps clinicians and patients choose which option best fits an individual 
patient’s needs and preferences.”   FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.  
145 As Mark Miller, Executive Director of MedPAC, explained, “we expected to see 
a lot more drug-drug, device-device, medical treatment versus surgical” comparisons as 
recommended research priorities.  Mark Miller, Remarks at the Public Meeting of the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 107 (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Remarks at 
MedPAC Meeting], available at http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/0909MedPAC.pdf.  
MedPAC Commissioner Dr. Thomas Dean expressed his surprise “at how vague or 
kind of non-focused some of the [IOM’s priority] recommendations were,” as well as 
his disappointment with the lack of specifics.  Thomas Dean, Remarks at MedPAC 
Meeting, supra, at 109.  He further opined, “At least from a clinical point of view, that’s 
what we would need to make clinical decisions.  From a policy point of view, maybe 
some of the other broader things.”  Id. 
146 Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 203.   
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1.  Cost 
The gold standard in medical research—the type of investigation 
most likely to produce data compelling to the larger medical communi-
ty—remains the randomized controlled trial (RCT).147  RCTs are al-
ready expensive and time-consuming to conduct for general-efficacy 
trials.148  A core feature of CER, however, is the inclusion of distinct pa-
tient subgroups to reflect real world circumstances.149  To achieve this 
broader focus, comparative effectiveness RCTs will often need to in-
volve more subjects than general-efficacy RCTs, adding to the cost and 
time required to complete the investigations.  Also, to draw conclusions 
about the value of different treatments relative to each other, CER will 
likely need to detect small differences in outcomes.  These differences 
may only become statistically significant when observed in a sufficiently 
large group of subjects.  This increases the need to involve larger sam-
ple populations, making the studies even more expensive to conduct.150 
2.  Secondary Data, Less Rigorous Research Methodologies, 
and Varying Measures of Effectiveness 
 Ironically, the CER movement may be a victim of its own success 
in calling attention to the flimsy foundation of scientific information 
underlying many current medical practices.  The new push for CER 
has presumably heightened physician interest in better evidence.  Yet 
this raises the question:  why should physicians trust that CER is suffi-
ciently “better evidence”? 
Indeed, CER studies often cannot be designed with a high degree 
of scientific rigor.  For example, switching some subjects from custo-
mary treatments may be seen as inappropriate before the comparative 
evidence becomes available.  Also, it may not be possible to draw suffi-
ciently large study populations from different patient subgroups.  Ac-
 
147 See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 211 (2d 
ed. 1986) (“[T]he RCT is the gold standard . . . .”); Noah, supra note 112, at 381 (listing 
RCTs as the preferred study model when health professionals are “faced with a clinical 
problem”).  In an RCT, subjects are randomly assigned to receive one of several clinical 
interventions.  The possible interventions include the standard of comparison or control.  
The control may be the leading customary treatment, a placebo, or no treatment at all.  
Study Design, DUKE UNIV. MED. CTR. ONLINE, http://www.mclibrary.duke.edu/subject/ 
ebm/studies.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
148 See generally Analysis of Comparative Effectiveness, RAND HEALTH COMPARE, 
http://www.randcompare.org/analysis-of-options/analysis-of-comparative-effectiveness 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
149 See supra Section I.D. 
150 See Luce et al., supra note 66, at 208. 
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cordingly, for many treatment comparisons, the traditional standards 
for RCTs will need to be loosened; this could mean allocating subjects 
unequally between different arms of a study or incorporating informa-
tion from observational studies and other secondary data sources into 
the base evidence for the RCTs.151  Adjustments in this manner create 
more flexibility but also invite physician concern about the persua-
siveness of the data.152 
Some CER studies will not utilize RCTs at all, but rather will rely in-
stead on secondary research, such as meta-analysis, systematic reviews of 
existing literature, observational studies, medical registries review, and 
analysis of existing claims and medical records.153  But physicians have 
traditionally viewed such secondary research methodologies as less 
convincing than, and inferior to, carefully structured RCTs.154  Also, 
because CER involves more diverse groups of patients than traditional 
efficacy investigations, it raises “the analytical challenges of making 
crisp inferences”155 from base data sets that will be noisier and messier, 
making it harder to isolate which interventions produced which the-
rapeutic outcomes.  This likely will require more frequent use of new-
er statistical techniques, such as adaptive strategies that change end-
points midstream through a study or that include new treatments for 
comparison while some data has already been accrued.156  Yet com-
munity practitioners have less familiarity and comfort with these re-
search methods. 
Physicians can also legitimately question the basic effectiveness 
criteria chosen for comparative study.  The seemingly simple question, 
“Is treatment A more effective than treatment B?” is really not so sim-
ple.  Even if one excludes cost-effectiveness from the definition of 
CER,157 considerable uncertainty remains about how to measure treat-
ments against each other.  With chronic cancer care, for example, one 
treatment may offer longer term survival rates or better objective meas-
ures, such as tumor shrinkage, but may have less tolerable medication 
 
151 See id. (discussing implementation of “adaptive” RCTs). 
152 The goal of making CER pragmatic and quickly responsive to clinicians may 
conflict at times with the concurrent goal of generating hard scientific data.  See Eu-
gene C. Rich, The Policy Debate over Public Investment in Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 752, 752-53 (2009). 
153 Id. at 752-53. 
154 See Luce et al., supra note 66, at 206 (“[RCTs] are the most rigorous method of 
generating comparative effectiveness evidence . . . .”). 
155 Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 205.  
156 See Luce et al., supra note 66.  
157 See supra Section I.E. 
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side effects or may fare worse in controlling other debilitating symp-
toms of the underlying cancer.158  Without greater consensus on what is 
to be specifically compared in effectiveness studies, individual physi-
cians will regard some CER data as incomplete and unconvincing. 
3.  Accounting for Individual Patient Differences 
Some physicians remain indifferent to or unpersuaded by CER 
because they doubt whether the research adequately captures each 
patient’s individual circumstances.  High-quality CER supposedly ac-
counts for the experiences and treatment responses of different sub-
groups of patients, making the research more context specific to par-
ticular individuals, not just the average patient.159  PPACA attempts to 
advance such work by requiring that governmentally funded CER take 
into account potential effectiveness differences when treatments are 
used “with various subpopulations, such as racial and ethnic minori-
ties, women, age, and groups of individuals with different comorbidi-
ties, [or] genetic and molecular sub-types.”160 
But at the end of the day, CER studies can be individually tailored 
only so much.  Translating the studies into clinical practice will re-
quire generalizing the experience of some subgroup of patients to the 
individual patient at hand where inevitable differences in age, gender, 
health status, medication history, genetics, and other factors still exist.  
Moreover, in looking primarily at the relative clinical effectiveness of 
different treatments, CER may not adequately account for other fac-
tors that physicians regard as important to their individual patients’ 
medical decisions, such as quality of life, the actual burdens imposed 
by the treatment, and the treatment’s cost.161  No matter how rigorous 
the research methodologies used to address patient subgroup differ-
ences, physicians may rightly be concerned that a particular CER 
study did not include subjects truly representative of their own pa-
tients, especially because treatment responses can be highly patient 
 
158 Nancy Berlinger & Anne Lederman Flamm, Define “Effective”:  The Curious Case 
of Chronic Cancer, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 17, 18. 
159 See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 6 (calling for CER to ac-
count for groups “traditionally under-represented in medical research,” such as minor-
ities, children, and those with multiple chronic conditions).   
160 PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2)(D) (West 
Supp. 1A 2010).  The law further requires that CER investigations “include members of 
such subpopulations as subjects in the research as feasible and appropriate.”  Id. 
161 Research Should Be Patient-Focused, Comparative Effectiveness Council Told, 3 Life Sci. 
L. & Indus. Rep. (BNA) 657 (2009). 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2181 
specific.  As Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 
Commissioner Dr. Thomas Dean has observed, 
We’re never going to have perfect data.  There’s always going to be pa-
tients who have unique situations, and we have to make sure that our pol-
icies allow for that, and that if we make good clinical decisions that don’t 
entirely follow [the CER results], there has to be allowance for that.
162
 
4.  Accounting for Individual Provider Differences 
The flip side of whether CER adequately captures the varying cir-
cumstances of each patient is whether it sufficiently accounts for the 
distinctions between health care providers.  This is especially impor-
tant because CER aims to improve the existing evidence base in part 
by rigorously evaluating surgical procedures and other treatments not 
ordinarily subject to regulatory review by the FDA in its oversight of 
drugs, devices, and biologics.163  Provider differences can have a signif-
icant influence on the effectiveness of such interventions.  Physicians 
offering the exact same surgical procedure to very similar patients, for 
example, may still vary considerably in treatment outcomes due to 
physicians’ different experiences and skills.164 
The recent Randomized On/Off Bypass (ROOBY) trial sponsored 
by the Department of Veterans Affairs165 serves as a cautionary exam-
ple of how provider differences can weaken the persuasiveness of CER 
investigations.  Researchers designed the ROOBY trial to test the 
comparative effectiveness of “off-pump” bypass surgery for cardiac pa-
tients.166  Traditional bypass surgery involves using a heart-lung ma-
chine, or “pump,” to circulate blood for the patient while physicians 
stop the heart to perform the surgical connections.167  The newer off-
pump technique avoids use of the machine, and allows surgeons to 
 
162 Dean, supra note 145, at 111-12. 
163 See supra Part II. 
164 PPACA recognizes this by providing that funded research “be designed, as ap-
propriate, to take into account different characteristics of treatment modalities,” such 
as “the impact of the skill of the operator of the treatment modality.”  PPACA 
sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2)(E).  Despite such efforts, it 
remains to be seen whether the research can be designed to overcome physician con-
cerns about this variable. 
165 See generally A. Laurie Shroyer et al., On-Pump Versus Off-Pump Coronary-Artery By-
pass Surgery, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827 (2009). 
166 Id. at 1828. 
167 Gina Kolata, Older Bypass Method Is Best, A Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, 
at A20. 
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operate while the heart still beats.168  The interest in off-pump surge-
ries developed in part because of concerns that patients even tempo-
rarily dependent on the heart-lung machine were at higher risk of de-
veloping neuropsychological problems, strokes, and other 
complications postsurgery—perhaps due to the way in which the 
pump oxygenates and circulates the blood.169  Off-pump surgery at-
tracted considerable interest in the past decade, with surgeons per-
forming an estimated twenty percent of bypasses off-pump.170 
Yet the ROOBY trial produced surprising results that called into 
question the enthusiasm for off-pump surgery.  Researchers saw no 
difference in neuropsychological outcomes between the on-pump and 
off-pump patient groups, directly challenging the supposed advantag-
es of off-pump surgery.171  Moreover, the investigation found that the 
off-pump patients had worse therapeutic outcomes overall, requiring 
more repeat surgeries and also having higher complication rates after 
one year.172 
In some respects, the ROOBY trial worked just as optimal CER 
should.  It provided rigorous scientific evidence for physicians to re-
consider their medical choices and challenged physicians’ often uncrit-
ical enthusiasm for technological innovation, demonstrating that new-
er is not always better.  The results, published in the prestigious New 
England Journal of Medicine, made big news in the medical community.  
In the words of Dr. Eric Peterson, an academic cardiologist at Duke 
who wrote an editorial accompanying the study,173 “This is a big one.”174  
Meanwhile, Dr. Michael Lauer, director of cardiovascular sciences at 
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, said that he hoped the 
ROOBY trial would lead to a decline in off-pump surgeries.175 
Yet anecdotal reports suggest that a good number of physicians 
have not been convinced to change their surgical approaches.  For 
example, Dr. Nirav Patel, a cardiac specialist at New York’s Lenox Hill 
Hospital, told the New York Times that he would not alter his practice, 
which involves an estimated ninety-five percent of his patients receiv-
 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  
171 See Shroyer et al., supra note 165, at 1827.  
172 Id. at 1828-29.  The researchers “hypothesized that there would be no differ-
ence between the . . . procedures . . . .”  Id. at 1828. 
173 See Eric David Peterson, Innovation and Comparative-Effectiveness Research in Car-
diac Surgery, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1897 (2009). 
174 Kolata, supra note 167. 
175 Id.  
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ing off-pump surgery.176  Dr. Patel said that he had performed more 
than 1400 off-pump surgeries, likely more than many of the physicians 
studied in the ROOBY trial, and he thought that his skills had im-
proved significantly due to the increase in procedure volume.177  Let-
ters to the editor following the study’s medical journal publication si-
milarly warned about the confounding complications posed by 
physician skill differences and relative experience rates.178  The quite 
bumpy road experienced by the ROOBY trial illustrates the consider-
able difficulties that arise in translating CER into clinical practice. 
5.  Keeping Pace with Innovation 
Some physicians discount CER because of concerns that it cannot 
keep pace with the rapid speed of medical innovation and shifting 
views of clinicians.  As previously noted, many CER studies will take a 
long time to complete because the research aims to include a broader 
range of patient subgroups as subjects,179 while other CER investiga-
tions will be based on secondary review of existing data arising from 
already completed studies.180  As such, a time lag occurs between the 
data collection and the research study’s public dissemination.  During 
this interval, what clinicians view as the best competing treatment al-
ternatives may change and, moreover, entirely new treatment ap-
proaches may develop.  For example, oncologist Leonard Zwelling ar-
gues, “Since CER uses analyses of older, previously completed studies 
or collections of clinical data from disparate hospital records, CER is 
unlikely to help the individual with a newly diagnosed cancer in 2010.  
 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., John D. Puskas et al., Letter to the Editor, On-Pump Versus Off-Pump 
CABG, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 851, 851 (2010) (“It is illogical to conduct a randomized 
trial comparing patient outcomes with alternative surgical techniques among surgical 
operators who have grossly asymmetric experience and expertise with the two proce-
dures being compared.  This is the ‘fatal flaw’ of the ROOBY trial.”).  On-pump surge-
ons in the trial were somewhat more likely to have been residents instead of attending 
physicians.  See Shroyer et al., supra note 165, at 1836.  Also, the off-pump surgeons 
might have lacked sufficient experience with that procedure to represent its advantag-
es fairly, while the level of expertise of the cardiac anesthesiologist, another relevant 
factor in surgical success, was not reported.  See Peterson, supra note 173, at 1898. 
179 See supra Section III.B.3. 
180 See Leonard A. Zwelling, Op-Ed., “Comparative Effectiveness” Research is Always 
Behind the Curve, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2010, at A23 (arguing that CER cannot keep 
pace with advances in medicine as it relies on “old data” in a misguided attempt to 
standardize therapy and reduce costs). 
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That patient may choose among therapeutic options that were unavail-
able even a few years ago.”181 
Also, the effectiveness of a treatment studied as part of a CER in-
vestigation may change over time as physicians develop expert skill in 
administering it, or as better understanding evolves of how patients’ 
genetic differences interact with the underlying disease and the pro-
posed treatment.  Accordingly, physicians may view some CER studies 
as stale on arrival.182 
6.  Uncertain Answers 
At bottom, CER may not be compelling to some physicians be-
cause it often fails to give sufficiently definitive answers.  For example, 
comparison of drug versus surgical treatment for the same illness may 
reveal that the surgical procedure is more risky in terms of complica-
tions and post-treatment morbidity but that it also produces longer 
lasting improvements among patients who do experience a therapeu-
tic benefit.183  Physicians may be left wondering what to make of such 
data in terms of deciding treatment for the patient at hand.  Although 
CER promises to include broader, more representative study popula-
tions, it is difficult to capture these multiple considerations consistent-
ly in each investigation.  As a result, inherent degrees of uncertainty 
will always remain even after the results of CER studies roll in.  Thus, 
the research may prove more frustrating than reassuring, as “it often 
fails to show which treatment is best, and for whom. . . . Instead of giv-
ing definitive answers, it opens the door to new questions . . . .”184  
Some physicians can be expected to act conservatively in the face of 
this uncertainty and call for even more data before they are willing to 
change longstanding practice patterns. 
C.  Financial Incentives 
Health care financing also increases the risk of physician tune-out 
because current payment rules fail to reward physicians for adopting 
 
181 Id.  
182 See McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 9 (“[S]ome critics argue that CER 
results are likely to be misused, and the evidence may be outdated by the time it is 
available.”). 
183 See Susan Gilbert, The Nesting-Egg Problem:  Why Comparative Effectiveness Research 
Is Trickier Than It Looks, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 11, 11-12 (discussing 
the tendency of CER to “open[] the door to new questions” rather than to give “defini-
tive answers”). 
184 Id.  
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CER into clinical practice.  As noted earlier, Medicare reimburses 
physician services so long as they meet the statutory “reasonable and 
necessary” coverage criteria.185  And under Medicare’s physician fee 
schedule, the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), physi-
cians generally receive higher payments for services that are consi-
dered more intense and that require more physician work effort.186  
Thus, Medicare payments to physicians do not generally depend on 
whether the physician chose a more clinically effective (or, for that 
matter, cost-effective) treatment.  Moreover, because of the way in 
which the various financial incentives misalign to encourage the per-
formance of more complex services and more services overall, the 
current Medicare rules can inadvertently reward physicians for offer-
ing treatments less effective than their alternatives.187 
The Medicare approach reflects larger reimbursement trends.  
PPACA leaves private payers considerable discretion to ignore CER re-
sults in setting reimbursement policy.188  In fact, few payers, public or 
private, apply reimbursement rules that reward physicians for choos-
ing treatments based on comparative effectiveness.  Most payment sys-
tems generally remain “quality insensitive.”189  Physician reimburse-
ment continues to be, for the most part, fee-for-service, under which 
physicians can generate payment for each discrete reimbursable ser-
vice they provide, notwithstanding the outcome.  Also, most health 
 
185 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006); see also supra notes 92-94 and accom-
panying text. 
186 Under Medicare’s RBRVS fee schedule, physicians receive higher payments for 
services that are considered to require greater skill and time to perform.  At bottom, it 
remains a fee-for-service system, with physicians generally paid based on the reimburs-
able services that they provide, not on the quality of the outcome.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395w-4 (setting out the rules of payment for physicians’ services); Thomas L. Grea-
ney, Economic Regulation of Physicians:  A Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1189, 1201-02 (2009) (characterizing RBRVS ratemaking as “a politicized . . . process” 
that results in fees that “have sent distorted economic signals to the market”).   
187 This effect is due to the fact that the RBRVS fee schedule, and the fee-for-
service payment system generally, are ordinarily insensitive to the quality of the treat-
ment outcome.  For example, “[s]ervices that contribute greatly to high-quality care 
that are labor- or time-intensive and rely less on technical resources, such as patient 
education in self-management of chronic conditions and care coordination, tend to be 
undervalued and are not adequately reflected in current payment arrangements.”  
INST OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE 4 (2007). 
188 See supra Section I.F. 
189 Hyman, supra note 106, at 372; see also McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 13 
(“[T]he current fee-for-service reimbursement environment provides limited incen-
tives at best to use effective treatments that cost less:  virtually all of the treatments, big 
and small, that vary substantially from area to area receive higher payments when they 
are used more often, not necessarily when they contribute to better outcomes.”). 
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plans make coverage decisions with little regard for comparative effec-
tiveness, so physicians can continue to recommend treatments that do 
not work as well as available alternatives.190 
D.  Bias and Public/Private Oversight 
Suspicions of bias also lead some physicians to question the integr-
ity of the national CER program.  As previously noted, in a move that 
awarded significant authority to private groups, PPACA abolished the 
previous federal-commission-type oversight structure for CER (the 
Federal CER Council) and replaced it with the PCOR Institute.191  The 
PCOR Institute will award publicly funded research contracts, identify 
national priorities for CER investigations, and set the agenda for and 
direct the nation’s CER program.192  Yet it is not an agency, govern-
mental unit, or otherwise purely public entity.  To be incorporated as 
a new nonprofit corporation, the PCOR Institute will have a mix of 
public and private representation on its governing board, with private 
members in the majority.193  Also, three members must represent drug 
and device manufacturers, and three other members must represent 
private payers.194  The initial board of governors, which the Comptrol-
ler General selects, includes officials from powerful drug and device 
firms Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, and Pfizer, and representatives 
from influential payers BlueCross BlueShield and Xerox.195 
Taken in its most favorable light, the PCOR Institute is consistent 
with the “new governance” theory that favors multistakeholder deci-
sionmaking, various degrees of agency delegation and mediated self-
regulation, and enlistment of private expertise and resources to ad-
dress complex public problems.196  Also, health care regulation already 
 
190 See Pearson, supra note 38, at 72 (“[M]ore often, comparative effectiveness in-
formation has little impact at all as coverage is granted even in the absence of good 
evidence, and payment for new interventions is determined by traditional formulas 
divorced from consideration of evidence on comparative clinical effectiveness.”). 
191 See PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e (West Supp. 1A 2010); id. 
sec. 6302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8. 
192 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d). 
193 See supra note 48 (explaining the structure and membership of the PCOR Insti-
tute’s governing board). 
194 See id. 
195 See id.   
196 The term “new governance” is intentionally used broadly here to cover differ-
ent, if somewhat overlapping, schools of thought that favor breaking away from both 
traditional public regulation and complete deregulation.  The various theories have 
numerous labels, including “new governance,” “reflexive law,” “responsible regula-
tion,” “outsourcing regulation,” and “public/private.”  These approaches share an in-
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involves public/private collaborations in various forms.197  Thus, the 
fact that private interests will have a significant role in directing the 
PCOR Institute and, in turn, overseeing the new national CER pro-
gram is not reason alone to dismiss this regulatory approach as biased 
or illegitimate. 
But as an innovative form of new governance, the PCOR Institute 
seems poorly conceived.  To succeed, new governance collaborations 
must do more than simply enlist the participation of multiple public 
and private actors and hope for the best.  Fragmentation, opacity, and 
unaccountability can hinder new governance approaches.198  Also, new 
governance models must be careful of agency capture by powerful 
stakeholders, especially because direct regulation to address power 
imbalances may be less likely given the influence ceded to private ac-
tors.199  Plus, new governance models must account for real human 
behavior and the way stakeholders actually behave in collaborative set-
tings.200  Moreover, when it comes to health care, even new gover-
 
terest in participatory governance structures, tapping the expertise and capacity of pri-
vate interests and nongovernmental actors, and horizontal rather than vertical over-
sight.  The new governance paradigm also views regulatory power as diffused among 
and arising from networks of public and private actors operating together through ne-
gotiated relationships.  See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REG-
ULATION:  TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Jody Freeman, The Pri-
vate Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (recognizing the pervasive 
presence of private actors in governance); Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law:  
Multiple Directions in Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89 (2007) (exploring 
the development of new governance perspectives in health care law); Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal:  The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (summarizing theoretical insights of new gover-
nance scholars). 
197 The Joint Commission, a private accrediting body for the nation’s hospitals and 
other institutional providers, is one example.  One of its committees, which features 
public and private actors, wields significant influence in public governance by estab-
lishing quality standards that are then incorporated into the regulatory conditions of 
participation in the Medicare program.  See Freeman, supra note 196, at 610-12 (de-
scribing the committee as made up of professional, industrial, and government repre-
sentatives).  More recently, planning initiatives for public health emergencies have 
demonstrated the importance of public/private collaborations, such as public health 
departments looking to the business community for help in developing and imple-
menting infectious disease control measures.  See Hunter, supra note 196, at 106-09 
(using the handling of the SARS outbreak to illustrate public/private collaboration). 
198 See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:  Theory 
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 32-35 (2005) 
(summarizing critiques of new governance theories). 
199 See id. at 32-33. 
200 See id. at 35; Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism:  An Introduc-
tion, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (discussing a critique of the new governance mod-
el’s ability to predict and respond to human tendencies). 
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nance proponents recognize that without meaningful participation 
from physicians—who perform key roles as gatekeepers and trusted 
agents—new governance approaches will usually fail.  Indeed, “[t]he 
role of physicians is crucial in order for new governance in health care 
to be successful.”201 
These considerations cast doubt on the PCOR Institute’s likely ef-
fectiveness.  Although the PCOR Institute includes multiple stakehold-
ers, including physician representatives, it does not sufficiently account 
for the perspective of ordinary physicians in the clinical trenches.  For 
example, the PCOR Institute could, in theory, increase the interest of 
frontline practitioners by eliciting their clinical views about the stan-
dards that should be applied to CER investigations or the treatment 
comparisons most needed to improve delivery of care. 
Yet the shared governance role of private industry has under-
standably raised physician concerns of politicized science and industry 
bias.  After all, certain CER studies may discredit the effectiveness of 
particular drugs and devices or call into question the reimbursement 
and coverage polices of particular health plans.  Will private members 
of the PCOR Institute’s governing board be able to support and ad-
vance independent CER studies that reflect critically on their consti-
tuencies’ products and policies?  Wary physicians already doubt it.  Ac-
cording to Harry Selker and Alastair Wood, the law “ced[es] substantial 
influence to the medical products industries that have a major interest 
in the outcomes of such research.”202  They warn that CER should be 
“free of the potential taint of commercial and political meddling.”203 
In partial recognition of bias concerns, PPACA applies modest 
conflict-of-interest provisions to PCOR Institute board members.204  Al-
so, the new law requires that most CER investigations undergo peer 
review and that the PCOR Institute work with an expert methodology 
committee to develop better and consistent standards, such as criteria 
 
201 Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 245, 249 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 
2006). 
202 Harry P. Selker & Alastair J.J. Wood, Industry Influence on Comparative-Effectiveness 
Research Funded Through Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2595, 2596 (2009). 
203 Id. at 2597. 
204 Among other things, disclosure of conflicts of interest is required, and members 
of the governing board are to recuse themselves when they or family members have a 
direct financial interest of any amount in the results of a CER investigation.  PPACA 
sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f)(2) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  The same 
disclosure is required when they or their family derive a financial benefit (over $10,000 
annually) from an entity that owns or manufactures a product or service subject to a 
CER investigation.  Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a)(4). 
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for validity and feasibility, to apply to funded investigations.205  None-
theless, doubts remain as to  whether these safeguards will be suffi-
cient.  Many of the conflict-of-interest provisions seem dependent on 
enforcement by the governing board.206  Plus, this would hardly be the 
first instance in biomedical research where conflict-of-interest provi-
sions as written in the books are not consistently followed or enforced 
in actual practice.207 
The behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that led to the crea-
tion of the PCOR Institute has created additional transparency and ac-
countability concerns.  The House of Representatives’ health reform 
bill, which ultimately did not become law, would have utilized a public 
model for CER oversight by establishing a new center for CER within 
the Agency for Healthcare and Research Quality (AHRQ).208  But heavy 
lobbying by the Partnership to Improve Patient Care (PIPC) helped 
convince Congress to move to a private/public model with the final 
health reform law.209  PIPC, despite including various medical profes-
 
205 Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d). 
206 For example, the statute simply states that members of the PCOR Institute will be 
recused when they have an applicable conflict of interest, but does not describe how the 
recusal request is initiated.  Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f)(2).  
The most likely scenario is that the board as a whole will enforce the recusal provisions 
against individual board members.  Also, the PCOR Institute is supposed to ensure that 
the members of expert advisory panels disclose conflicts of interest.  Id.  Again, the go-
verning board as a whole would presumably have to undertake such actions. 
207 See, e.g., Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research (reporting 
the close relationship between biomedical research institutions and for-profit busi-
nesses), in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC:  THE HASTINGS CENTER BIO-
ETHICS BRIEFING BOOK 31, 32-33 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008); Gardiner Harris & Bene-
dict Carey, Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at A1 
(“Universities ask professors to report their conflicts but do almost nothing to verify 
the accuracy of these voluntary disclosures.”); Rick Weiss, “Serious Misconduct” by NIH 
Expert Found, WASH. POST, June 14, 2006, at A6 (reporting that a researcher traded val-
uable tissue specimens for money because of “lax oversight”). 
208 The House reform bill also would have established an independent CER 
Commission to oversee the activities of the CER program within the AHRQ.  Afforda-
ble Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1401 (2009). 
209 Since the Recovery Act’s initial heavy funding for CER, “[a] major goal” of PIPC 
has been to “give industry a seat at the table” in deciding what CER studies to conduct.  
Alicia Mundy, Drug Makers Fight Stimulus Provision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at A4; see also 
Howard Brody, Now It’s Time to Start Clearing the Land Mines..CER, HOOKED:  ETHICS, 
MED., AND PHARMA (Mar. 23, 2010, 4:59 PM), http://brodyhooked.blogspot.com/ 
2010/03/now-its-time-to-start-clearing-land.html (“PIPC has been waging a stealth 
campaign, superficially applauding CER while trying hard behind the scenes to be sure 
that CER never gets to grow any teeth.”).  PIPC indeed publicly applauded the even-
tual CER provisions in the final health care reform law.  See Press Release, P’ship to Im-
prove Patient Care, PIPC Applauds New Health Care Bill’s CER Language (Mar. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.improvepatientcare.org/news-media/pipc-applauds-new- 
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sional societies in its coalition such as the American College of Cardi-
ology, largely represents the pharmaceutical industry.  The Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the powerful drug 
industry trade group, formed the coalition, and PIPC has received 
support from major pharmaceutical firms such as Merck.210 
E.  Clinical Autonomy and the Technological Imperative 
Even if very high-quality, bias-free CER data can be produced at a 
reasonable cost, other factors suggest that physicians will be hesitant to 
use this information.  Sociological studies of medical practice reveal 
that physicians highly value clinical autonomy, a preference reinforced 
by medical custom and a strong sense of professionalism.211  Physicians 
traditionally resist intrusions on their independent professional judg-
ment and will buck interventions that seem to direct individual treat-
ment decisions.212  Physicians can prove quite formidable in evading 
and undermining attempts to change their practice patterns, includ-
ing through the effective strategy of passive resistance.  Because of 
their strong preference for and expectations of clinical autonomy, 
physicians remain especially distrustful of practice guidelines or cov-
erage decisions that do not seem physician driven, but rather appear 
motivated by institutional politics, cost control, or similar concerns.213  
Even initiatives to change practice patterns for quality reasons tend to 
 
health-care-bill’s-cer-language (follow the hyperlink under “Attachment”) (“This legis-
lation will help ensure that CER is used to help doctors and patients make the best 
treatment decisions possible . . . .”). 
210 Jonathan D. Salant & Aliza Marcus, Drugmakers Boost Lobbying To Police Drug 
Comparisons, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2010, 16:49 EDT),  http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHjr0BP1zvgo. 
211 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE:  A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF AP-
PLIED KNOWLEDGE 23-33, 137-57, 359-82 (Robert Bierstedt ed., 4th prtg. 1972).   
212 See Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice:  What (If Anything) Happens to 
Professionalism?, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 5-6 (1996) (noting tensions between indepen-
dent medical professionals and health care bureaucracies); Hall, supra note 25, at 451 
(describing “clinical autonomy” as the medical profession’s “most sensitive nerve”); 
Edward A. Pont, The Culture of Physician Autonomy:  1900 to the Present, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 98, 100 (2000) (discussing the history of physician reactions to 
government “encroachment[]”). 
213 Hall, supra note 25, at 450-52; see also Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 
2708, 2713 (1987) (noting the difficulty of convincing physicians to follow National 
Institutes of Health recommendations). 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2191 
fail unless they sufficiently preserve physicians’ ability to exercise in-
dependent discretion.214 
Ensuring greater physician input into the design of CER does not 
necessarily resolve the clinical-autonomy problems.  Studies of medi-
cal culture indicate that individual autonomy, more so than profes-
sional autonomy as a whole, is what matters to the typical physician.  
Physicians’ training and professional orientation make them wary of 
ceding clinical discretion even to their peers.215  The fact that other 
physicians developed a CER study may thus fail to assuage the individ-
ual physician’s concerns about loss of professional authority.  Indeed, 
CER relies on sophisticated statistical techniques to draw conclusions 
from the experiences of groups of patients, rather than relying on an 
individual physician’s impressions from isolated clinical experiences.  
As with evidence-based medicine generally, this emphasis threatens 
individual physician autonomy because it gives greater authority to 
statisticians, institutional managers, academic researchers, and others 
while seemingly devaluing the weight and influence of the individual 
clinician’s judgment.216 
Recent physician focus-group discussions conducted by MedPAC 
staff demonstrate the depth of physicians’ clinical autonomy con-
cerns regarding CER.217  MedPAC researchers interviewed primary 
and specialist physicians in a variety of practice settings.  Some physi-
cian respondents firmly opposed CER.  This group worried that pay-
ers and the government would use CER to dictate treatment through 
mandatory practice guidelines.  This group further believed that 
“personal experience with a treatment was enough for them to make 
treatment decisions.”218  One physician remarked, “We have our 
 
214 See James L. Reinertsen, Zen and the Art of Physician Autonomy Maintenance, 138 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 992, 993-94 (2003) (detailing common arguments that physi-
cians use to defy evidence-based guidelines and protocols).  For example, the TQM in-
itiatives introduced in medical centers in the 1990s largely floundered, due in part to 
clinical autonomy concerns.  See Weber & Joshi, supra note 28, at 389-92.  A more recent 
example concerns health care institutions’ attempts to impose antibiotic-control poli-
cies.  Although initiated for valid public-health reasons, the control programs have gen-
erated resistance because of physicians’ desire to control their own work.  See Richard 
S. Saver, In Tepid Defense of Population Health:  Physicians and Antibiotic Resistance, 34 AM. 
J.L. & MED., 431, 478-79 (2008). 
215 See Hall, supra note 25, at 462-63.  
216 See Marc A. Rodwin, The Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 439, 440-41 (2001) (discussing shifts in power from physicians to other 
decisionmakers). 
217 See, e.g., Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 96-127. 
218 Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 100-01. 
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judgment.  If we like something, if it works, great.  If it doesn’t, then 
we try something else.”219 
Related to physicians’ strong desire for professional discretion is 
the “technological imperative.”  Under this powerful medical norm, 
physicians consider use of the latest technologies in the clinic as a sign 
of improvement in care.220  Innovation, in this view, reflects medicine 
working at its best and reinforces the physician’s esteemed role as 
technocratic expert mediating new scientific advances for the benefit 
of the patient.  Accordingly, physicians highly value the clinical au-
tonomy to switch to newer treatments and services when they see fit.  
However, even with the best of intentions, this can lead some physi-
cians to “embrace new procedures and technologies prematurely, be-
fore much evidence exists to support their enthusiasm.”221 
An anticipated benefit of CER is that it will demonstrate when new 
treatments really seem to offer little improvement in effectiveness over 
older treatments.222  However, getting physicians to be more cautious 
about embracing new technology will not be easy.  The physician’s be-
lief in the superiority of her own judgment, rightly or wrongly, is not 
easily swayed by “better” data.  As one commentator observes, doctors 
“inevitably believe in their technologies and products, making it tricky 
to get them to willingly lay down their arms.”223 
F.  “Individualized” Medicine 
As previously noted, some physicians find CER unpersuasive be-
cause they believe that it does not sufficiently account for the differ-
ences between individual patients.224  In fact, concern for what works 
best for the individual patient presents formidable translation barriers, 
above and beyond questioning the relevance of particular CER data.  
Physicians’ strong commitment to individualized medicine, an orienta-
 
219 Id. at 101; see also Mushlin & Ghomrawi, supra note 84, at e6(1) (“Unfortun-
ately, there is still a widespread lack of understanding about what CER will do—and 
fear that it will do more harm than good, in part by threatening individual physicians’ 
autonomy and professionalism.”). 
220 See, e.g., Muriel R. Gillick, The Technological Imperative and the Battle for the Hearts 
of America, 50 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 276, 276 (2007) (discussing, as an example of 
the technological imperative, physicians’ uncritical adoption of the left ventricular as-
sist device for treatment of advanced heart failure). 
221 Noah, supra note 112, at 393-94.   
222 See supra subsection III.B.4 (discussing the ROOBY trial that called into ques-
tion the benefits of off-pump cardiac surgery). 
223 See Wachter, supra note 14. 
224 See supra subsection III.B.3. 
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tion encouraged by medical ethics, health law, and professional norms, 
remains in significant tension with CER’s group-based foundations. 
Health care has traditionally been divided between individual and 
population health, a fragmentation that can undermine overall health 
care delivery.225  At the individual health level, a physician provides 
treatment tailored for a specific patient within the confines of the spe-
cial doctor-patient relationship.  Population health, in contrast, con-
cerns the health of the aggregate number of individuals in the com-
munity and involves activities such as infectious-disease control and 
surveillance reporting to public health agencies.226  For the communi-
ty physician, the individual-health paradigm has typically dominated 
over population health considerations.  Physicians’ training, medical 
norms, ethical guidance, and the law surrounding the doctor-patient 
relationship all emphasize strong fidelity to each patient.  This strong 
emphasis on individualized medicine discourages consideration of the 
population-health perspective.227  Doing what is best for a single pa-
tient can lead a physician to neglect population-health responsibili-
ties, as has been seen with uneven reporting of infectious diseases to 
public-health authorities228 and physicians’ imprudent conservation of 
the antibiotic supply.229 
The dominance of the individual-health paradigm discourages 
physicians’ receptiveness to CER.  By privileging evidence gathered 
from treatment interventions at the group or subgroup level, rather 
than relying on isolated clinical experiences, CER aims to provide a 
more scientific foundation for medical decisionmaking.  But commu-
nity physicians, following a predominantly individual-health perspec-
tive, favor any benefit to the patient at hand.  In other words, CER asks 
whether reliable evidence, generated from the experience of patient 
 
225 See Arnold J. Rosoff, Policy Challenges in Modern Health Care, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 
523, 525 (2005) (book review) (“[M]any of the core policy challenges facing health 
care today involve the interaction between individual health and public health and the 
inevitable tradeoffs that arise in trying to optimize health at both levels.”). 
226 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 10-
11 (2d ed. 2008). 
227 See Saver, supra note 214, at 454-61 (listing hindrances to physicians’ considera-
tion of the public health perspective and concluding “that many physicians are rather 
reluctant, passive defenders of population health”).   
228 See, e.g., Janet S. St. Lawrence et al., STD Screening, Testing, Case Reporting, and 
Clinical Partner Notification Practices:  A National Survey of US Physicians, 92 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1784, 1787 (2002) (finding low physician compliance with laws that require 
reporting of sexually transmitted diseases, an activity critical to population health sur-
veillance efforts). 
229 See Saver, supra note 214, at 460-61.  
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groups, supports offering treatment A over treatment B in similar cas-
es.  However, the community physician more likely wants to know 
which treatment—A, B, or something altogether different—might work 
for this patient.  Studies suggest physicians have stronger feelings of 
obligation to individual, known patients than to larger group inter-
ests.230  This bias toward doing what possibly could benefit a particular 
patient—a bias supported by current legal rules—makes it difficult to 
advance the broader public interest in many aspects of health policy.231  
It similarly complicates physicians’ willingness to embrace CER. 
Along these lines, some physicians worry that imprudent applica-
tion of CER presents quality hazards.  Under this view, CER generaliz-
es from the results of the larger population as to what is best for a par-
ticular patient—an approach that can, unwittingly, lead to worse 
medical care.  Evidence-based medicine guidelines in the past have 
been discredited by later, more refined evidence-based research that 
showed significant need to vary “best practices” for different patients.  
Harvard University physician Jerome Groopman, a frequent critic of 
the government’s new CER agenda, warns that in its zeal to improve 
the evidence base through CER, the government is imprudently push-
ing a one-size-fits-all approach that can worsen the quality of care.232  
According to Groopman, CER works best when the medical practices 
compared are repetitive, mechanical, involve the same basic clinical 
factors, and therefore can be standardized to a large degree across a 
group of patients.233  But he cautions that many other medical practic-
es are “significantly altered by the condition of the individual patient” 
or “must be adapted to a particular person.”234  “[O]nce we depart 
from such mechanical procedures and impose a single ‘best practice’ 
on a complex malady, our treatment is too often inadequate.”235  The 
MedPAC physician survey similarly indicated that many physicians 
 
230 See, e.g., Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical De-
cisions for Individual Patients and for Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163-64 (1990). 
231 William Sage refers to these duties to individual patients as “relational duties,” 
which contrast with the physician’s “regulatory duties” to advance larger societal goals 
for the health care system.  William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the 
Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 
500-01 (2008). 
232 Jerome Groopman, Health Care:  Who Knows “Best”?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 11, 
2010, at 12, 13. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
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worry that overreliance on CER will interfere with their ability to tailor 
treatment to individual patients.236 
To be sure, not all proponents of individualized medicine view 
CER as a threat or as a vehicle for “cookbook” medicine.  Physicians 
such as Pauline Chen argue that CER actually solidifies the individual 
doctor-patient relationship.237  According to Chen, evidence of relative 
ineffectiveness can counter the physician’s bias to try active medical 
intervention to help the patient when better medical practice might 
be to pursue a course of watchful waiting or to do nothing at all.238 
Other commentators similarly suggest that, if done right, CER 
supports rather than undermines the physician’s ability to provide in-
dividualized care.  “Personalized medicine” emphasizes using individ-
ual genetic information to select better treatments and biologically tai-
loring medical interventions to fit a patient’s circumstances and 
needs.239  High-quality CER, if extended broadly to various subgroups 
of patients, may yield important data for such efforts and significantly 
advance the practice of personalized medicine.240 
But to work in this manner, CER will have to produce compelling 
results that are broad and deep enough to capture the many genetic 
and other biological differences between patients.  This will necessitate 
ongoing revision to CER investigations.  It will also require confidence 
that the underlying biological-marker tests are consistent and accurate 
and that the data reveal meaningful differences in treatment responses 
among patient subgroups.  These preconditions seem daunting.  So 
far, personalized-medicine research has proven more difficult to con-
duct in practice than initially hoped, and therapies targeted to genetic 
differences have yielded few real medical breakthroughs.241 
 
236 In summarizing the data, MedPAC commissioner Herb B. Kuhn observed that 
“this issue of non-interference within the physician-patient relationship is loud and 
clear.”  Herb B. Kuhn, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 108.   
237 See Pauline W. Chen, A Tool to Strengthen the Doctor-Patient Relationship, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 15, 16-17. 
238 Id. 
239 Alan M. Garber & Sean R. Tunis, Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research Threaten 
Personalized Medicine?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1925, 1925 (2009). 
240 See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 6 (“[C]omparative effec-
tiveness should complement the trend in medicine to develop personalized medi-
cine—the ability to customize a drug and dose based on individual patient and disease 
characteristics.  One of the advantages of large comparative effectiveness studies is the 
power to investigate effects at the sub-group level that often cannot be determined in a 
randomized trial.”). 
241 See Andrew Pollack, Patient’s DNA May Be Signal to Tailor Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2008, at A1, A16 (describing problems with nonpersonalized medicine); Su-
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G.  Liability Concerns 
Liability concerns also dampen physicians’ enthusiasm for CER.  
According to MedPAC’s survey of physicians,242 some physicians deeply 
worry about increased liability exposure if they end up disregarding 
CER, even when they have valid reasons for doing so, such as indivi-
dually tailoring treatment to the patient.243  The concern is that a phy-
sician pursuing a care pathway not well supported by CER becomes 
necessarily vulnerable to claims that she has adopted outmoded, un-
sound treatments.244  According to classic deterrence theory, physician 
recognition of liability risk for disregarding CER should be a good 
thing.  This will encourage physicians to change their practice patterns 
and conform to a CER-influenced standard of care.  Alternatively, it 
will encourage physicians dissatisfied with CER findings to contribute 
evidence to new CER investigations to improve the quality of informa-
tion generated.  Under this view, physician liability concerns should 
actually help to translate CER into medical practice more readily. 
Although tort deterrence improves the quality of care in theory, 
the reality has often been messier.  The malpractice system expe-
riences high costs and considerable problems in accurately determin-
ing departures from the standard of care.245  Also, many other con-
founding factors can greatly blunt the deterrence effect of the tort 
system, which may exert the weakest influence over individual physi-
cians, as opposed to hospitals and other institutional providers.246  
Thus, without significant changes, the malpractice system will likely 
 
san Gilbert, Behind the Curtain of Personalized Medicine:  The Havasupai Tribe Settlement, 
BIOETHICS FORUM (June 14, 2010, 1:50 PM),  http://www.thehastingscenter.org/ 
Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=4705&blogid=140 (discussing the need for continued 
improvement in personalized medicine techniques like genetic tests). 
242 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
243 See Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 103.   
244 See Fay Rozovsky, A Risk Manager’s Tour of the ARRA, AM. SOC’Y HEALTHCARE 
RISK MGMT. 5 (May 2009), http://www.ashrm.org/ashrm/education/development/ 
monographs/Mono_ARRA.pdf. 
245 See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Commentary, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System:  
What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 
1641-45 (2002) (reporting that instead of fault, the best predictor of the size of a tort 
award is the severity of disability); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensa-
tion Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025, 2029-
31 (2006) (analyzing the costs involved with malpractice suits). 
246 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:  Theory 
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1623 (2002) (“[T]he deterrent 
effect occurs primarily at the institutional level.  Individual providers will always lack 
strong tort incentives to improve care because most are sued so infrequently.”). 
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not provide highly nuanced, fine-tuned incentives with regard to CER.  
Instead, it will operate crudely, at best. 
Moreover, complicating the analysis is that physicians’ concerns 
about liability run in two directions.  MedPAC’s physician survey, as 
noted, indicated that some physicians worry about liability when depart-
ing from CER.247  But in a lose-either-way scenario, other physicians fear 
that if they conform their practices to CER, they will face enhanced liability 
exposure.  These concerns arise for several reasons.  Physicians may 
rightly question whether lay juries will understand the importance of 
CER, particularly where the research purports to discredit the effec-
tiveness of commonly offered treatments.  Physicians who adopt less-is-
more treatment strategies based on CER may worry that juries will un-
favorably view such actions as stinting on care.  Also, as a doctrinal mat-
ter, existing medical custom ordinarily defines the standard of care,248 
not what research suggests should be done.  Physicians may fear that 
custom will trump CER in hard cases, regardless of whether custom ac-
tually works or is more effective than what CER suggests. 
The lawsuit against Dr. Daniel Merenstein, a third-year resident 
practicing in Virginia, stands out as a cautionary tale.  Dr. Merenstein 
wrote a widely discussed 2004 column in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, detailing how he was sued for not ordering a 
screening test, the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test, for a patient 
who later died of prostate cancer.249  The defense argued that evidence-
based medicine practice guidelines amply supported Dr. Merenstein’s 
decision.250  The relevant guidelines questioned the routine ordering 
of PSA tests in these situations because of false positive results, emo-
tional stress, costs, and other negative factors.251  The guidelines instead 
recommended shared decisionmaking between patients and physicians 
on whether to order the test.252  Meanwhile, the plaintiff put forth evi-
dence that local custom among physicians in the community was to 
 
247 See Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 103.   
248 See Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 125 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(“[P]rofessionals are usually held only to a standard of custom and practice . . . .”).  But 
see Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
909, 913-917 (2002) (arguing that state courts have been retreating from the tradition-
al rule that custom defines the medical standard of care and replacing it with a reason-
able physician standard). 
249 See Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004). 
250 Id. at 15-16. 
251 Id. at 15. 
252 Id. 
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order the test routinely.253  Although the jury found Dr. Merenstein 
not liable individually, it found against his residency program and 
awarded the plaintiff $1 million.254  Dr. Merenstein and others have 
interpreted the case as a verdict against evidence-based medicine.255  
Under this view, the jury disregarded more rigorous, systematic evi-
dence about the PSA test and sanctioned the residency program be-
cause other physicians still practiced the older, allegedly inferior 
way.256  As Dr. Merenstein lamented, the malpractice system appeared 
to be “punishing the translation of evidence into practice, impeding 
improvements to care, and ensconcing practices that hurt patients.”257 
These concerns, discussed in the context of evidence-based medi-
cine generally, clearly apply to CER.  It may be, however, that physi-
cians’ liability fears are overstated.  Cases like Dr. Merenstein’s may not 
accurately reflect how the malpractice system would handle most CER-
related disputes.258  This would not be the first instance where physi-
cians overstate liability risks.259  But the concern about enhanced liabili-
ty exists, whether accurate or not, and such perceptions can powerfully 
motivate physician behavior.  In short, physicians’ liability views make 
them more tentative about embracing CER in daily clinical practice. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considerable barriers, including most importantly the lack of 
strong incentives for physicians to adapt to the evidence, impede 
health care reform’s rollout of CER.  Nonetheless, recognition of the 
importance of the physician’s gatekeeper role suggests that initiatives 
targeted to engage physicians more directly could help a great deal.  
This Part considers a few promising options. 
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 16. 
255 See, e.g., Darshak Sanghavi, Do We Have a Winner?:  How to Reform the Broken Med-
ical Malpractice System, SLATE, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2235027. 
256 Merenstein, supra note 249, at 16.  
257 Id.  
258 See Mark A. Hall et al., Letter to the Editor, 291 JAMA 1697 (2004) (questioning 
the general applicability of the Merenstein case because the jury may have found against 
the residency program for other reasons than the adoption of evidence-based practice). 
259 See, e.g., Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 
17 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 463, 463 (1992) (finding that physicians’ perception of 
the risk of facing a malpractice suit was three times the actual risk); Am. Roentgen 
Ray Soc’y, Radiologists Overestimate Their Overall Risk of Malpractice Lawsuits in Breast Imag-
ing, SCI. DAILY, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/02/ 
090202175100.htm (reporting that radiologists perceived a thirty-five percent risk of 
being sued in the next five years despite the actual risk being ten percent). 
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A.  Coverage Rules and Financial Incentives 
A critical first step is to relax the restrictions on using CER for 
reimbursement purposes.260  Well-designed financial incentives could 
jump-start physicians’ interest in comparative effectiveness.  However, 
development of such incentives requires that payers have greater flex-
ibility to rely on CER when choosing to cover certain technology or 
when deciding which procedures should receive higher payments 
than others.  While it is true that PPACA does not absolutely preclude 
use of CER for reimbursement purposes, it makes it difficult to do 
so.261  It is also true that the new law primarily imposes its restrictions 
on linking CER with reimbursement on Medicare and other govern-
mental health care programs, not private payers.262  Yet easing the re-
strictions on Medicare alone could have a beneficial spillover effect 
for the entire health care system.  Medicare covers a significant share 
of patients in the market overall.263  As such a large payer, it com-
mands a powerful position to act as “first mover,”264 with private payers 
more likely to follow. 
More flexible application of Medicare’s “coverage with evidence 
development” (CED) rules is one option to develop better synergy be-
tween reimbursement and CER.  Under the CED rules, Medicare gen-
erally can condition payment for a promising new medical treatment 
on beneficiaries enrolling in a clinical trial that will develop further 
information about whether the treatment meets Medicare’s “reasona-
ble and necessary” coverage criteria.265  Under this approach, Medi-
 
260 See supra Section I.F (explaining PPACA’s limitations on CER use). 
261 See supra Section I.F. 
262 Supra Section I.F. 
263 As of 2008, Medicare covers approximately fifteen percent of United States res-
idents.  Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Data Compendium, 2009 Edition, CENTERS 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., tbl.VII.4 (Dec. 2009), http://www.cms.gov/ 
DataCompendium/15_2009_Data_Compendium.asp.   Twenty-three percent of total 
national health care spending is for the Medicare program.  HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING:  FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-05.pdf. 
264 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
265 For Medicare’s general coverage criteria for physician services, see supra notes 
185-87 and accompanying text.  Medicare has formalized its CED approach though an 
agency guidance document.  See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NA-
TIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COV-
ERAGE:  COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at https:// 
www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-
details.aspx?MCDId=8.  Conditioning payment on study participation is a particular 
form of CED known as “Coverage With Study Participation.”  Id.  The CED process is, 
however, not without its critics.  See, e.g., Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Tri-
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care will also generally require that participating physicians not offer 
the intervention to patients not enrolled in the study.266  The basic 
point of the CED rules is to “move beyond yes/no coverage deci-
sions”267 that can prove difficult to make in the absence of good in-
formation.  When applying CED status to a technology, Medicare al-
lows limited access to it, so long as it is part of a clinical trial that can, 
hopefully, yield more evidence about whether the technology meets 
Medicare’s regular coverage criteria and should be covered on a pro-
gram-wide basis. 
Yet Medicare has so far used the CED authority on very few occa-
sions.268  Information gathered during CED-reimbursed studies also 
tends to concern general effectiveness, not comparative effectiveness, 
due to the statutory criteria for Medicare coverage.269  Changes to the 
Medicare statute and agency policies that allowed more frequent use 
of the CED process and that made comparative effectiveness informa-
tion matter more for future program-wide coverage decisions of 
treatments introduced initially through the CED rules, would help in-
crease physician receptiveness.  Subjecting promising but unclear 
treatments to CED would allow physicians (and patients) some discre-
tion to adopt new technology, thus respecting physicians’ clinical au-
tonomy concerns and accommodating their interest in exploring new 
technology.270  Importantly, this would entail individual physicians par-
ticipating more directly in the generation of comprehensive compara-
tive effectiveness evidence, which hopefully would heighten their in-
 
als:  Conscripting Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 366 (2010) (conclud-
ing the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ practices are “heavy-handed” and 
contravene federal regulations). 
266 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 265.   
267 MedPAC Cites Challenges to Wide Use of Coverage with Evidence Development, 8 Med. 
Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 767 (Nov. 18, 2009). 
268 See Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare’s National Coverage Decisions for Technologies, 
1999–2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1620, 1623 (2008) (“CMS used its CED policy in seven de-
cisions through 2007 . . . .”). 
269 For the criteria for Medicare coverage, see supra notes 185-87 and accompany-
ing text.  For complaints about the limitations of CED, see Mindy Yochelson, “Coverage 
with Evidence Development” Falling Short, Former CMS Official Says, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y 
Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 174 (Mar. 17, 2010).  Cf. David Orentlicher, Making Research a 
Requirement of Treatment:  Why We Should Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients to Partici-
pate in Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 20, 20-22 (noting the need 
for better comparative effectiveness information and suggesting that physicians 
should be able to condition continued care on their patients’ willingness to partici-
pate in comparative-efficacy trials). 
270 See supra Section III.E. 
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terest in the research results.  This would also develop a more robust 
evidence base to guide future coverage and treatment decisions. 
In addition to linking coverage of treatments to evidence of com-
parative effectiveness, payers could offer physicians financial incen-
tives for adhering to clinical practice guidelines based on solid CER.  
Guideline implementation studies from different medical disciplines 
indicate that when physicians receive financial rewards, guideline ad-
herence has been somewhat more successful.271  Financial incentives 
continue to be one of the most powerful tools for driving physician 
behavior.272  Such incentives can improve the often only short-term 
impact of educational appeals by giving physicians a continual interest 
in reevaluating their practice patterns.273  Also, compared to other im-
plementation measures, such as treatment mandates or outright cov-
erage denials, financial incentives may be more physician friendly be-
cause they better preserve physician discretion.274  Financial incentives 
do not require a particular course of treatment, allowing room for the 
clinician to tailor care to the particular patient as she sees fit and earn 
(or not earn) a particular reward.  This approach is more compatible 
with physicians’ strong desire for professional autonomy275 and their 
commitment to individualized medicine.276 
Financial incentives cannot eradicate all physician concerns about 
the persuasiveness of CER.  Further, there is a possible danger in try-
ing to override those concerns, some of which raise legitimate thera-
peutic issues,277 by financially rewarding physicians to follow CER in all 
cases.  Not all CER guidelines will be of high quality.  Some may suffer 
 
271 Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields:  The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 682-83 (2001). 
272 See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS:  THE LAW, ETH-
ICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 171 (1997) (“[T]here is no dispute 
about whether financial incentives will work . . . .”); cf. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, 
MONEY & MORALS:  PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 97-105 (1993) (discussing the 
possible dangers of using financial incentives to increase or decrease services); Fred J. 
Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed Care Plans:  
A Review of the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 294, 311 (1996) (“[F]inancial incen-
tives are a key element in explaining the success of managed care plans in reducing 
the utilization of health services.”). 
273 See Hall, supra note 25, at 480. 
274 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less:  Financial Incentives 
to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 174-77 (1996) (observing that the alternative of 
caps on specific services would restrict physicians’ ability to tailor care to the needs of a 
given patient). 
275 See supra Section III.E. 
276 See supra Section III.F. 
277 See supra Sections III.B, III.F. 
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from lack of rigor or industry bias.  Appropriate criteria need to be 
applied consistently to identify which CER-influenced guidelines are 
sufficiently credible.  Entities such as the PCOR Institute or the AHRQ 
could play a key role by certifying particular CER-influenced guide-
lines as high quality.278  The certification process ideally would eva-
luate guideline credibility based on generally recognized best practic-
es, such as representation of multispecialties among the guideline 
authors and disclosure by authors of financial conflicts of interest.279 
Firmer linkage of financial incentives and CER could not only in-
crease physician receptiveness but also provide a feedback loop that 
helps improve the quality of CER generally.  Well-designed financial 
incentives—especially those targeted to the performance of groups of 
physicians instead of individual clinicians—encourage physicians to 
pool information about treatments, as well as to monitor the treatment 
choices of other physicians.280  This increased information flow may 
help better identify where the current state of CER needs improve-
ment.  Indeed, even if the initial CER-influenced guidelines are weak 
or subject to differing clinical opinion, the financial incentives pro-
vide a continual reason for physicians to pay attention to comparative 
effectiveness.  This helps combat physician tune-out and challenges 
physicians to recommend changes for improving the guidelines.281 
B.  Malpractice Liability Incentives 
Reforms should also address physicians’ malpractice liability fears 
about CER.282  This could be accomplished in several ways.  Malpractice-
liability-reduction incentives could be linked to physicians’ com-
 
278 Other commentators urge a greater role for the private market in improving 
the quality of clinical practice guidelines.  One such proposal is to have private firms 
compete in offering high-quality guidelines to physicians.  The firms would also be fi-
nancially responsible for any injuries caused by substandard guidelines that they 
promulgated, thus aligning the firms’ and physicians’ incentives for quality improve-
ment.  See Avraham, supra note 116, at 39-40 (explaining the benefits of private-actor 
involvement in health care regulation).  
279 See generally Roberto Grilli et al., Practice Guidelines Developed by Specialty Societies:  
The Need for a Critical Appraisal, 355 LANCET, Jan. 8, 2000, at 103, 104-05 (evaluating 
existing guidelines and finding many of them lacking). 
280 See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physi-
cians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 408 (1996) (“[W]e have good reason to hope that finan-
cial incentives will help move providers to pool their information and eliminate 
some . . . overcare.”). 
281 Cf. Hall, supra note 25, at 479 (making a similar point about incentives and 
guidelines more generally). 
282 See supra Section III.G. 
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pliance with guidelines based on solid CER.  Research suggests that 
physicians comply with recommended guidelines at somewhat better 
rates when they receive a reduction in malpractice insurance pre-
miums in return for following the guidelines.283  A more comprehen-
sive malpractice-linked initiative would provide liability safe harbors to 
physicians who comply with guidelines based on solid CER.  Under 
such an approach, physicians would enjoy complete immunity or ben-
efit from a rebuttable presumption that they met the standard of care 
if they could demonstrate that high-quality evidence of comparative 
effectiveness supported their treatment choice. 
Because such approaches “would give physicians a legal incentive 
to practice evidence-based medicine, liability reform could be an ef-
fective way to foster the uptake of CER findings.”284  Indeed, given 
physicians’ deep concerns about a malpractice-liability system run 
amok, they would likely welcome some form of tort relief.  As such, 
this option would prove far more physician-friendly than limiting 
reimbursement coverage based on CER.285 
C.  Academic Detailing 
Greater use of academic detailing could also increase physician 
receptiveness to CER.  In an attempt to “fight fire with fire,” academic 
detailing tries to copy the highly successful marketing techniques that 
pharmaceutical firms use to promote their medications to physi-
cians.286  Academic detailing embraces pharmaceutical firms’ persua-
sion methods but endeavors to provide more balanced information 
compared to what physicians learn from drug-company advertising 
and related sources.287  The persuasion strategies include utilizing phy-
sician peer educators to promote the benefits of a particular product 
through face-to-face meetings, physician interviews to assess baseline 
knowledge and prescribing motivations, and the deployment of con-
 
283 See Mello, supra note 271, at 683. 
284 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Medical Liability Reform in 
Federal Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2009). 
285 See id. 
286 See Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (“Aca-
demic Detailing”) To Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549 (1990). 
287 See PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, FACT SHEET—ACADEMIC DETAILING:  EVI-
DENCE-BASED PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 1 (2009), available at  http:// 
www.prescriptionproject.org/tools/fact_sheets/files/0007.pdf (“[T]he approach re-
sembles the marketing approach of drug companies, but instead . . . present[s] bal-
anced, evidence-based information about common prescribing choices without a 
sales agenda.”). 
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cise, consistent informational messages in discussing the product.288  
Academic-detailing initiatives have demonstrated moderate success in 
bolstering quality and improving physician adherence to practice 
guidelines across a variety of medical disciplines.289 
With regard to CER, academic detailers could communicate par-
ticular comparative effectiveness study information to physicians and 
encourage them to adapt treatment practices accordingly.  Part of the 
appeal of this approach is that if the right physician representatives 
are chosen as CER promoters, this can leverage physicians’ interest in 
what their peers do and the influence of local opinion leaders in the 
medical community,290 which offers more power than simply publiciz-
ing CER study results. 
Unfortunately, the national CER program does not yet seem to 
contemplate academic detailing to a significant degree.  PPACA does 
task the Office of Communication and Knowledge Transfer (the Com-
munication Office), a unit within the AHRQ, with general responsibility 
for dissemination of CER results.291  The dissemination methods de-
scribed in the statute, although not meant to be an exhaustive list, are 
for the most part more passive educational approaches, such as de-
veloping a publicly available database of CER information or using 
clinical-decision support technology to deliver the information to phy-
sicians.292  PPACA further provides that the Communication Office 
should regularly collect “feedback” from physicians and other stake-
holders about the “value of the information disseminated,”293 perhaps 
opening the door to useful detailing techniques such as baseline as-
sessments of physicians’ knowledge and motivations in ordering cer-
tain treatments.  But the statute does not expressly mention academic 
detailing and is largely silent about other interactive methods of in-
formation dissemination. 
 
288 See id. at 2. 
289 See, e.g., id. (summarizing evidence showing that “interactive techniques like 
academic detailing are the most effective means to improve physician practices and 
patient outcomes”); Michael Allen et al., Family Physicians’ Perceptions of Academic De-
tailing:  A Quantitative and Qualitative Study, 7 BMC MED. EDUC., no. 36 (2007), 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/7/36 (discussing the features of academic 
detailing that physicians find most educational); James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines 
and Policies:  Can They Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 783, 787 (2005) (concluding that outreach methods are the “most effective, 
albeit costly, method” of modifying physician behavior). 
290 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
291 PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
292 Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(a)(1). 
293 Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(c). 
SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:12 PM 
2011] Health Care Reform’s Wild Card 2205 
As such, much depends on how the PCOR Institute, the Commu-
nication Office, and other relevant entities will choose to conduct 
CER dissemination initiatives.  In a welcome development, the AHRQ 
is using some portion of its Recovery Act stimulus funding to support 
academic detailing.  The agency has asked for proposals from contrac-
tors to help design academic detailing programs promoting compara-
tive effectiveness information.294  While such initiatives are encourag-
ing, to engage the physician audience effectively, academic detailing 
should become a more prominent and consistent feature of the na-
tional CER program. 
D.  Comparative Implementation Research 
A final recommendation follows from heeding the important in-
sight of the CER movement:  anecdotal impressions, best intentions, 
and custom can be misleading—look instead to solid comparative evi-
dence about what works best.  In other words, in seeking to support 
CER, the health care system should deliberately experiment with, and 
compare different strategies for, translating it into clinical practice.  
Many possible methods—such as information dissemination through 
peer educators or financial incentives for guideline compliance—
seem intriguing, but they have not been systematically evaluated 
against each other in terms of effectiveness rates for fostering CER up-
take by physicians.  And policymakers and regulators may consider en-
tirely new implementation methods in the future.  Given health care 
reform’s record funding for research comparing the effectiveness of 
different treatments, it seems prudent also to invest heavily in re-
search that compares the effectiveness of different CER implementation 
strategies.  As Elizabeth Docteur and Robert Berenson have observed, 
[H]owever great the potential importance of new research findings to be 
generated through new CER, there is greater marginal value to be gained 
from devoting additional resources to investigating why evidence so often 
has a limited and slow impact on practice, evaluating policies and practic-
es that improve uptake of treatments with demonstrated effectiveness, 
disseminating effective implementation strategies, and implementing 
changes in incentives or other initiatives that prove effective.295 
 
294 See Bronwyn Mixter, Congressional Leaders Praise AHRQ for Funding “Academic De-
tailing” Program, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 249 (Apr. 21, 2010). 
295 DOCTEUR & BERENSON, supra note 37, at 10; see also Lauer & Collins, supra note 
120, at 2183 (“There is increasing recognition that the processes of dissemination and 
implementation are legitimate targets for rigorous scientific evaluation.”). 
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A viable national CER program simply needs better evidence about 
what works best for translating the research results into clinical practice.  
Yet it remains unclear whether the government’s new CER agenda will 
allocate sufficient resources to comparative-implementation research or 
make effective use of it.  The now-disbanded Federal CER Council296 
seemingly recognized the critical need for such research, but ultimately 
downgraded CER’s importance by characterizing it as a “secondary in-
vestment[].”297  Somewhat in contrast, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
has advised that “[k]nowledge translation research must be a high 
priority.”298  Yet PPACA provides only lukewarm support for engaging 
in rigorous comparative analysis of implementation strategies and does 
not expressly require spending CER funds for such investigations.299  
Much therefore depends on the discretion of the PCOR Institute and 
other relevant entities in implementing the new national CER pro-
gram.  Hopefully, they will follow the IOM’s suggested approach by 
continually looking to and heavily investing in much-needed imple-
mentation research. 
CONCLUSION 
It must be remembered that the new national CER program will 
not function as a stand-alone proposition.  It remains but one compo-
nent of a more comprehensive reform agenda that will affect the 
health care system through multifaceted, interconnected levers.  For 
example, PPACA authorizes the newly created Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation to explore new payment models in order to 
provide stronger rewards for quality.300  Also, the new law creates the 
Independent Medicare Advisory Board to reign in governmental 
 
296 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
297 FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 43. 
298 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 159. 
299 For example, the Communication Office, see supra text accompanying note 291, 
is required to create tools for organizing CER information and to seek feedback from 
end users about the value of information disseminated.  PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 299b-37 (West Supp. 1A 2010).  Also, the Comptroller General is supposed 
to review the national CER program at least every five years, looking to “the effect of 
the dissemination of such [CER] findings on reducing practice variation and dispari-
ties in health care, and the effect of the research conducted and disseminated on in-
novation and the health care economy of the United States.”  Id. sec. 6301(a), 
§ 1181(g)(2)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(g)(2)(A)(iv).  But the statute does not re-
quire that specific amounts of CER funds be spent for implementation research.   
300 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text. 
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health care spending.301  Because CER is not intended to, and need 
not, shoulder the full responsibilities for bending the cost curve and 
improving quality of care, this Article’s detailed focus on the weak roll-
out of CER may seem misplaced. 
But these other initiatives will take a long time to implement, and 
their ultimate impact may be small.302  Moreover, CER’s intriguing po-
tential is that it has the theoretical power to reinforce and amplify 
other reform initiatives significantly.  Indeed, a viable CER program 
seems indispensible to health care reform’s ultimate success no matter 
how reform on the ground evolves and develops in coming years.  Af-
ter all, a solid comparative effectiveness evidence base is needed to 
address health care system fundamentals, such as deciding which ser-
vices to support, determining the relative value patients receive from 
the system, highlighting when common treatment pathways need 
reexamination, and identifying when spending cuts undermine very 
effective care.303  If CER is to complement other reform initiatives in 
this manner, however, the health care system must do more than 
simply develop the evidence.  It must also be in a position to act on 
the information generated.  In short, to even begin fulfilling some of 
its promise, CER must be deployed under better starting conditions.  
This means paying a great deal more attention to how physicians, the 
critical gatekeepers, will likely respond and directly confronting the 
serious risks of physician tune-out and indifference. 
 
 
301 Id. 
302 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
303 Cf. Mushlin & Ghomrawi, supra note 84, at e6(1)-(2) (“[C]hanges in coverage 
and care delivery must in fact be guided by knowledge about what is valuable to pre-
serve in our health care system.”). 
